kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-005

Because transaction costs, imperfect information, and bounded rationality shape the rulemaking process, even solutions that are optimal at enactment become unstable and suboptimal over time.

NIE recognizes that transaction costs, imperfect infor- mation, and bounded rationality impact the rulemaking process, rendering even optimal solutions to regulatory problems unstable and suboptimal over time

Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014), II.1 Learning Process to Improve Regulatory Information, p. 9
· source PDF

Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

• rules are enacted as stable and presumptively optimal

failuresupport: arguedfailure: decay of presumptively optimal rulesfamily: rule-obsolescence-and-ossificationeconomicsinstitutional-designrisk-and-incentives

• restates kaal:claim:2267560-019 NIE acknowledges that transaction costs, imperfect information, and bounded rationality influence the rulemaki...
• extends kaal:claim:2267560-005 Rulemaking conducted under conditions of incomplete information and bounded rationality produces suboptimal ou...
• specializes kaal:claim:2267560-033 Opportunistic behavior, transaction costs, and bounded rationality undermine comprehensive contracting, so con...

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/4ea11cc181f61862...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-005.md | sha256sum