entity · derived
Collective action problem
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying collective-action-problem. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2029983-009 : Harmonization invites its own defeat by creating an incentive for rogue jurisdictions to attract, into their legal systems, the private actors who do not agree with the harmonized rule.
- 2273857-020 : Financial regulation is characterized and controlled by a classic collective action problem, and as a consequence regulatory oversight is never constant.
- 2273857-021 : In the competition to shape financial policy through rulemaking, small and well organized special interest groups such as the financial industry dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors.
- 2273857-022 : During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, which temporarily overcomes the predominance of special interest grou
- 2273857-023 : Once crises recede, regulatory oversight diminishes as societies and markets return to their prior equilibrium, and this dichotomy causes reform legislation and deregulatory legislation to be enacted
- 2273857-053 : The core problem for financial regulation is timing: governance improvements are not enacted before crises when they are most needed, because the collective action problem makes financial regulation m