entity · derived
Nash equilibrium
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying nash-equilibrium. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 5225296-021 : Slashing establishes a Nash equilibrium in which rational validators adhere to honest behavior, because the expected cost of penalties exceeds any short-term gain available from misconduct.
- 5225296-032 : Weighted voting creates a Nash equilibrium favoring honest participation, because creating additional Sybil identities yields no extra voting power absent corresponding contributions.
- 5886442-024 : Nash's model, by presuming homo economicus unbound, overestimates human computational capacity and perpetuates a normative ideal that distorts policy and institutional design by justifying frictionles
- 5886442-025 : Policymakers who cling to Nashian ideals risk obsolescence, because the future demands governance that orchestrates agentic plenitude rather than governance that mitigates human imperfection.
- 6244278-028 : Under persistent reputation and multiplicative updates in the repeated game, honest evaluation is stronger than a one-shot focal point: it is the strategy that minimizes long-run regret for each valid
- 6269518-032 : Theorem 3b holds that under the integrated solution honest citation is a Nash equilibrium when validators assess citation accuracy and the marginal effect of citation accuracy on the honesty score exc
- 6269518-033 : The equilibrium depends on a design requirement rather than an assumption: mechanism parameters must be chosen so that the negative effect of increased self-citation on the honesty score outweighs its
- 6421319-028 : Contrary to the author's own prior version of this argument, Nash equilibrium does not become irrelevant in the AI2AI economy; it becomes simultaneously more accurate as a description of individual ag