entity · derived
Non fungibility
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying non-fungibility. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 3266953-013 : Reputation does not push a network toward centralization the way currency does, because reputation must be earned and can be lost yet cannot be turned into a fungible store of value exchangeable for g
- 3266953-021 : Because Semada's Anchor Protocol uses reputation scores as a non fungible currency to qualify for block propagation, the resulting proof of reputation consensus is attack resistant, fully decentralize
- 3405401-024 : Reputation used as a metric and store of value does not lead to centralization because it must be earned, it can be lost, and it cannot be converted into a fungible store of value exchangeable for goo
- 3406323-035 : Reputation avoids the recentralization dynamic that afflicts currencies because it must be earned and can be lost yet cannot be converted into a fungible store of value exchangeable for goods.
- 3782210-031 : A reputation token is inherently worth more to the person who earned it than to someone who merely bought it, because of its secondary use in making future earnings, so reputation is harder to accumul
- 3799320-029 : Reputation voting has two advantages over one token one vote: it is non fungible, which avoids corruptive elements, and it aligns incentives for members individually and for the institution as a whole
- 3981021-024 : Merit in the CHARITYxDAO is expressed by a non fungible reputation token that cannot be bought or sold, and voting is designed around staking those non fungible reputation tokens.
- 3981021-029 : Reputation staking avoids the corruptive effects of fungible token staking because non fungible reputation has to be built organically through merit and time, needs to be earned, and cannot be bought.