entity · derived
Opportunism
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying opportunism. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2097160-007 : Control rights in executive compensation contracts cannot sufficiently constrain ex post opportunism by executives, because of incomplete information, information asymmetry, bounded rationality, limit
- 2097160-008 : Adding contingent convertible bonds with an early trigger to executive compensation packages creates a corporate governance mechanism that addresses the inability of contractual control rights to cons
- 2097160-027 : Executives paid in contingent convertible bonds have an opportunistic reason to manipulate the triggering event, because conversion at a depressed price before or during a crisis hands them cheap stoc
- 2097160-028 : Where rules and regulatory guidance are absent, fiduciary duties are the only constraint on executives, and existing fiduciary duties could prove insufficient to limit opportunism and abuse when the p
- 2267560-033 : Opportunistic behavior, transaction costs, and bounded rationality undermine comprehensive contracting, so contracting parties do not specify all of their respective obligations ex-ante because antici
- 2992962-030 : Problems with smart contracts are inevitable because of subjectivity in human relationships, bounded rationality of coders and contracting parties, incomplete foresight, incomplete information, and op
- 3373393-007 : Agency problems originate from the lack of trust between principals and agents, which itself stems from information asymmetries and agents' opportunistic self-interested behavior.
- 3373393-026 : Agency relationships embedded in smart contracts run exactly as coded, without any possibility of opportunistic behavior by the agent, and all contractual terms are public and fully transparent.
- 3373393-037 : As agency relationships become more complex, a backstop for human behavior becomes necessary, and the claim that smart contract agency relationships run exactly as coded with no possibility of agent o
- 3441904-028 : The notion that smart contract agency relationships run exactly as coded with no possibility of agent opportunism is less likely to hold in complex agency relationships, so a decentralized human backs
- 3782210-002 : Markets collapse when opportunistic behavior saps the efficiency of cooperation: once the environment becomes too adversarial and trust is diminished, collaboration is no longer profitable.
- 3782210-003 : Strict legal enforcement is an inefficient remedy for opportunism because every unit of energy devoted to policing is energy that could instead have been used to cooperate productively.
- 3799320-025 : In any open and democratic system, naturally opportunistic rational parties will attempt to circumvent and game the applicable complex static rules to increase their share of power and profit.
- 3808873-037 : Effective institutional governance, human or machine, requires a duality of incentives in which actors improve their own utility while their actions benefit the whole institution over the long run, an
- 3962614-010 : Significant information asymmetries in venture capital can lead portfolio company managers to engage in opportunistic behavior after an investment is made.
- 5554218-022 : Automating smart contracts under the code is law paradigm incentivizes unethical behavior by enabling anonymous, opportunistic action, which reduces repeat business and undermines the minimization of
- 5886442-026 : Opportunism is engineered away in the AI-to-AI economy because agents have no endogenous psychological motives for guile and operate under mathematically specified, cryptographically verifiable object
- 6421319-030 : The AI2AI economy eliminates all the drivers of positive transaction costs at the substrate level simultaneously: opportunism is engineered away because agents lack endogenous psychological motives fo
- 6421319-031 : The governance apparatus New Institutional Economics developed to counteract opportunism, including vertical integration, relational contracting, reputation mechanisms, hostage taking, and third party