entity · derived
Political economy
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying political-economy. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1558614-040 : Because of the political climate and concern about the social externalities of business failure, monitoring requirements and their enforcement procedures are likely to become more severe regardless of
- 1664809-028 : Non-US individuals and companies are expressly prohibited by US law from contributing to US political campaigns and have a relatively weak lobby in Washington, which places EU financial intermediaries
- 1664809-029 : The defendants harmed by section 7216 would almost all be non-US financial intermediaries and issuers who are less able to defend themselves in the US political system, which helps explain why Congres
- 1765901-035 : The SEC study is very unlikely to produce an extraterritorial extension of private rights of action so long as Republicans control the House of Representatives.
- 1806252-024 : Legislators had disincentives to impose harsher requirements on the hedge fund industry before the crisis, because harsher regulation could have driven franchise taxes and other business to offshore c
- 1998455-025 : The political economy of financial regulation ensures that the expansion of regulatory oversight induced by Dodd-Frank will be followed by a phase of relaxation, since historically the introduction of
- 2029983-008 : Harmonization is politically unattainable absent either a central authority able to preempt the law of many jurisdictions or a single jurisdiction with enough economic clout to impose its rules on oth
- 2273857-016 : The aftermath of a financial crisis creates shock conditions that constitute a suboptimal environment for rulemaking.
- 2273857-017 : Post-crisis rulemaking occurs in an economic, political, and legal environment whose sense of urgency prevents a full evaluation of the consequences of new rules for all affected constituencies.
- 2273857-018 : The shock conditions that trigger calls for rulemaking have typically not been analyzed or absorbed systematically, so rulemaking under those conditions is associated with high levels of incomplete in
- 2273857-020 : Financial regulation is characterized and controlled by a classic collective action problem, and as a consequence regulatory oversight is never constant.
- 2273857-021 : In the competition to shape financial policy through rulemaking, small and well organized special interest groups such as the financial industry dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors.
- 2273857-023 : Once crises recede, regulatory oversight diminishes as societies and markets return to their prior equilibrium, and this dichotomy causes reform legislation and deregulatory legislation to be enacted
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-007 : A core tenet of incomplete contract theory, that rulemakers should act only when sufficient information becomes available, is often politically, economically, and practically undesirable or impossible
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017 : The inadaptability of stable and presumptively optimal rules intensifies competition between well organized special interest groups and latent groups, because inadaptable outcomes raise the stakes for
- 2740477-011 : The rising complexity of innovation driven regulatory issues confuses political and policy makers about rapidly emerging disruptive change, which makes a coherent political and policy solution to thos
- 2808132-012 : The political system is less likely to be able to resolve the challenges of disruptive innovation because the increasing complexity of innovation-driven regulatory issues causes confusion among politi
- 3405660-013 : A single global financial regulator is not a serious policy option because national political interests are incoherent and cannot readily be united to establish such a body.
- 3406323-009 : Decentralization transcends the capitalism versus socialism dichotomy because it uses elements of both profit generation and redistribution, organizing economic structures that generate profits while
- 4900880-028 : Redistributive preferences are shaped by perceived exposure to automation: priming individuals to consider their own vulnerability to an automation shock shifts what redistribution they support.
- 6421319-035 : Redistribution after the fact is likely to fail, because by the time it becomes politically feasible those controlling the AI economy may be powerful enough to evade meaningful taxation, a pattern his