entity · derived

Survey evidence

20 claims across 7 works, 2009–2017.

Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying survey-evidence. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.

Every claim under this term

• 1428387-013 2009 failure: Valuing thinly traded assets with exchange quotes is unsound because the price for less frequently traded assets may not indicate fair market value at the time of valuation, yet nearly a quarter of su
• 2470008-012 2014 empirical: National regulators reached opposite conclusions on the same question: unlike the OFR, FSB and IOSCO, the United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority concluded from its first comprehensive survey of
• 2470008-029 2014 empirical: More than forty percent of respondents in a prior study disagreed with the definitions or instructions in Form PF.
• 2732915-016 2016 empirical: A 2013 survey found that Form PF compliance costs for first time filers were under $10,000 for 59.18 percent of respondents, while subsequent annual Form PF filings cost no more than $5,000 for 57.14
• 2739479-004 2016 empirical: Prior survey evidence indicates that the hedge fund industry adjusted well to the Dodd-Frank registration and disclosure requirements, and that the actual impact of those rules was much less significa
• 2739479-020 2016 empirical: A majority of private fund adviser respondents in both surveys, 72 percent in 2012 and 75 percent in 2015, did not plan any strategic response, meaning any action to avoid or limit the impact of Title
• 2739479-021 2016 empirical: The share of advisers reporting that they changed their communications with investors nearly doubled from 25 percent in 2012 to 47 percent in 2015, a shift the author attributes to advisers increasing
• 2739479-022 2016 empirical: Although rare in absolute terms, structural responses grew: at least part of the industry is increasingly changing the legal structure of its funds and closing funds to new investors in response to th
• 2739479-024 2016 empirical: Between 2012 and 2015 the annual cost of Dodd-Frank compliance doubled for many survey respondents, moving from the $50,000 to $100,000 range into the $100,000 to $200,000 range.
• 2739479-025 2016 mechanism: The shift of reported compliance hours out of the 251 to 500 hour band and into the 100 to 250 hour band suggests the industry became more effective at satisfying Dodd-Frank reporting obligations betw
• 2739479-026 2016 condition: If compliance hour requirements are treated as a proxy for compliance cost, the survey data indicate that the cost of complying with all federal regulation, not just Dodd-Frank, increased between 2012
• 2739479-027 2016 mechanism: Private fund advisers increasingly factor the regulatory structure into decisions about the size of their assets under management, a shift partly explained by the higher post-Dodd-Frank cost structure
• 2739479-030 2016 empirical: Sensitivity to the Form PF quarterly reporting threshold rose sharply: only 19 percent of 2012 respondents took the $1.5 billion threshold into account, compared with 33 percent in 2015.
• 2739479-032 2016 empirical: A majority of respondents in both surveys, 76.1 percent in 2012 and 65 percent in 2015, believed the Dodd-Frank Act did not affect their reporting funds' earnings.
• 2739479-035 2016 empirical: Among advisers who saw an earnings effect, the attributed cause shifted from direct expense to opportunity cost between 2012 and 2015, with opportunity cost references rising from 9 percent to 32 perc
• 2739479-036 2016 empirical: By 2015 a clear majority of respondents, 93 percent, attributed effects on their investment management company's profits to additional expenses associated with the Dodd-Frank Act, and no respondent re
• 2816408-009 2016 empirical: Surveys of private fund managers conducted in 2012 and 2015 show that a clear majority of managers believed increased compliance costs negatively affect the industry.
• 2816408-010 2016 empirical: Private fund managers themselves distinguish costs from returns: a majority of surveyed managers opined that Dodd-Frank Act registration and disclosure requirements do not affect the returns of the pr
• 2959730-041 2017 empirical: Survey responses from blockchain using private investment fund advisers show that their fee structure deviates from the traditional 2/20 model, with responding managers reporting alternative fee struc
• 2998097-015 2017 empirical: The second survey found long-term negative effects of Title IV: 34.9 percent of respondents expected it to affect the industry over the next five years through additional expenses, and 32.6 percent ex

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