entity · derived
Venture capital
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying venture-capital. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2740477-005 : Venture capital can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation because venture capitalists' financial allocations to innovative projects generate feedback that regulators ca
- 2740477-006 : The empirical base for the argument is a PitchBook dataset covering 77,508 completed United States venture capital deals involving 37,298 companies across all venture capital stages from 2005 to 2015.
- 2740477-034 : The data analysis shows that venture capitalists' finance allocation, and the implicit assessment of innovative products and businesses it embodies, generates highly relevant institution specific and
- 2740477-035 : Data on venture capital investments lets regulators see where innovation trends are forming and what risks they entail before the disruptive innovation materializes, which is the specific remedy for r
- 2740477-036 : Industry specific venture capital investment data allows regulators to anticipate regulatory needs in the industries carrying the highest levels of disruptive innovation, and the level of disruptive i
- 2740477-037 : By identifying possible contingencies and necessary rule revisions from venture capital investment data ex ante, before disruptive innovation creates problems, regulators could anticipate regulatory n
- 2740477-038 : The authors concede a limitation of their own proposal: the innovation potential identified by venture capital finance allocation may not always be shared by the market at large.
- 2740477-039 : Venture capital has outrun regulation and regulation is now too slow to react, and that lag itself damages the process.
- 2740477-040 : The notice and comment procedures of the SEC are too slow, and the SEC's outdated micromanagement of markets is itself slowing down venture capital.
- 2808132-006 : Data derived from venture capital investments can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation, because venture capital's financial allocations to innovative projects supply f
- 2808132-037 : Venture capital deal flow, meaning the totality of potential deals and business plans screened by venture capitalists, would provide the optimal assessment of innovation trends, but that data is not a
- 2808132-038 : The study's evidence base is a PitchBook dataset of 77,508 United States venture capital deals involving 37,298 companies from 2005 through 2015, covering all venture capital deals and all venture cap
- 2808132-039 : A more granular assessment of venture capital investments in Big Data and software as a service can provide regulators with much needed feedback on the regulatory needs associated with those areas.
- 2808132-040 : Although aggregate venture capital sector data arguably only confirms what media reporting already showed for 2005 to 2015, the venture capital data, especially examined granularly, may provide earlie
- 2808132-041 : The dominance of later stage venture capital investments could be read as risk-averse follow-on behavior, but venture capital funds are unlikely to make later stage investments unless portfolio compan
- 2808132-042 : Venture capitalists' finance allocation and their implicit assessment of innovative products, businesses, and initiatives generate highly relevant institution-specific and industry-specific decentrali
- 2808132-043 : Regulation is mostly reactive and follows business cycles rather than being proactive; data on venture capital investments lets regulators see where innovation trends are heading and what risks they e
- 2808132-044 : Feedback effects from venture capitalists' finance allocations toward innovative products give rulemakers timely, decentralized, industry-specific and entity-specific information that allows them to a
- 2808132-045 : The decline in later stage robotics and drone investment rounds in the United States does not indicate stalled technological development; companies relocate later stage development to other countries
- 2808132-046 : The authors concede that the trend for venture-capital-financed technology companies to stay private and the market undervaluation of formerly venture-capital-financed companies mean the innovation po
- 2808132-047 : Even if regulators could obtain the depth of information needed for anticipatory rulemaking, acting on venture capital signals risks wasting scarce regulatory resources, because venture capital funds
- 2808132-050 : Companies that received venture capital investments have outrun and continue to outrun regulation and regulatory efforts, and they drive innovation trends in the United States and abroad.
- 2808132-052 : Venture capital investment allocation data can help facilitate anticipatory regulation of disruptive innovation, but it is only one of several emerging data sources usable for signaling in regulatory
- 2831040-033 : Deferred prosecution agreements and venture capital investment decisions increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and give at least some estimate of
- 2939127-021 : Venture capital investment in blockchain startups has grown exponentially since 2012, which the authors read as an indicator of the technology's commercial maturity.
- 2957645-013 : Deferred prosecution agreements and venture capital investment decisions function as dynamic regulatory tools because they increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information
- 2998033-037 : In the study's dataset the clear majority of private investment funds using blockchain technology are engaged in venture capital rather than hedge fund or private equity strategies.
- 3002908-035 : Fund type composition diverges across regions: in the United States hedge funds dominate the blockchain using sample, while in Europe venture capital funds clearly predominate.
- 3002908-039 : Initial coin offerings have overtaken venture capital as a funding channel for blockchain start ups, raising 331 million dollars in twelve months, and may become an alternative funding method for trad
- 3067615-013 : The disruption of venture capital by ICOs is in part self-inflicted: venture capital funds continuously invested in innovation while insufficiently innovating their own business model, leaving them ex
- 3067615-014 : In the second quarter of 2017 ICO issuances exceeded venture capital financing of start-ups for the first time, with $210 million invested in ICOs versus $180 million invested into start-ups via tradi
- 3067615-015 : The trend of ICO issuance exceeding venture capital financing can be expected to continue, because ICOs allocate capital more efficiently and at lower cost.
- 3067615-016 : ICOs are preferable to venture capital funding for many start-ups first and foremost because ICO promoters and their developers are not forced to sacrifice equity in the project in exchange for the fu
- 3067615-017 : Given the advantages of ICOs, traditional regulated IPOs and venture capital funds increasingly fail to adequately capitalize crypto and legacy ventures driven by new economic paradigms.
- 3067615-028 : On bankruptcy or termination of the platform, token holders typically have no liquidity preference and no recourse at all once debt holders and outside creditors are satisfied, so unlike a venture cap
- 3227967-006 : In early Silicon Valley the contractual mechanisms lawyers designed, together with the lawyer dominated market for reputation, reduced information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors and w
- 3227967-007 : A transaction engineer is a crucial intermediary who brings together, in a safe environment, parties holding different but mutually compatible interests and expertise.
- 3405660-014 : Additional direct limitations on hedge funds spill over onto other private investment pools such as venture capital funds and structured financings, which do not present the same systemic risk concern
- 3406323-005 : ICOs changed the venture funding market because they provide investors liquidity far faster than the traditional venture capital path to a late IPO or acquisition, letting venture funds capitalize on
- 3406323-006 : During the ICO boom years the venture capital market in the decentralized technology sector ground to a halt, and the later demise of the ICO market reversed the trend back toward venture funding.
- 3409548-031 : The shift of the digital asset market back from the ICO model to the venture model since late 2017 has reduced, not increased, diversification for investors.
- 3606663-002 : The funding sources for digital asset and blockchain startups cycled through four stages since 2016 and 2017: equity funding, then initial coin offerings, then equity offerings, then initial exchange
- 3606663-006 : By 2019 the ICO market had lost its defining advantage over venture capital: because most ICOs between 2018 and 2019 imposed one to three year lockups, neither market offered early liquidity to invest
- 3606663-008 : ICO issuance exceeded venture capital financing of startups for the first time in the second quarter of 2017, with $210 million invested through ICOs against $180 million invested through traditional
- 3606663-016 : Immature markets such as the market for digital assets in 2020 often cannot attract the institutional investors and venture capitalists who have sufficient operating experience in that market, which i
- 3606663-017 : Early stage investing in digital assets is a relationships business, and without access to a network of core industry expertise early stage investments in the digital asset industry are rarely success
- 3949098-005 : In the proposed DAO investment club, members substitute reputation non fungible token staking for capital commitments on incoming deals, the public market supplies the funding for approved deals, and
- 3949098-038 : The key difference from the traditional venture capital model is that the DAOIC only makes its investment choices public and never provides investment analysis, so public co purchases are entirely vol
- 3962614-001 : The rapid growth of digital asset startups into billion dollar businesses with little or no venture capital funding demonstrates that the traditional venture capital model alone was not enough to meet
- 3962614-002 : Decentralized reputation governance models in venture capital have the potential to upgrade the venture capital market.
- 3962614-003 : Lack of liquidity is one of the biggest problems in the traditional venture capital ecosystem, and the traditional VC model disincentivizes generating early profits because capital is locked in for an
- 3962614-004 : Early stage funding fell from thirty five to twenty seven percent of total VC funding as venture capitalists increasingly focused on funding later stage companies.
- 3962614-007 : Deal evaluation and risk assessment in traditional venture capital is fraught with inaccuracies and suboptimal incentives.
- 3962614-008 : A drawback of the traditional VC evaluation process is that perceptual, emotional, and cognitive processes affect the investment decision alongside financial considerations, because the evaluation cri
- 3962614-009 : None of the standard VC deal evaluation criteria reflect how a prospective deal may correlate with a deal already held in the capitalist's investment portfolio.
- 3962614-010 : Significant information asymmetries in venture capital can lead portfolio company managers to engage in opportunistic behavior after an investment is made.
- 3962614-011 : Because venture capitalists typically want to cash out their gains five to ten years after the initial investment, they play an active role in directing portfolio companies toward a merger, acquisitio
- 3962614-015 : As a rule of thumb in early investment rounds, the lower the information asymmetry the lower the payout, and below a certain threshold of established value venture capitalists will rarely invest at al
- 3962614-017 : At its peak in the 2019 cycle the volume of initial coin offerings surpassed venture capital firms and business angels as a fundraising method for startups.
- 3962614-018 : Information asymmetries increase in traditional VC investment rounds because startups are incentivized to self censor when engaging with VCs, having little data to work with and being reluctant to ove
- 3962614-019 : The typical VC fee based compensation structure can lead to serious shortcomings, including excessive fundraising, suboptimal investments, misevaluation, and overfunding of portfolio companies during
- 3962614-043 : Reputation as capital has the potential to lower capital requirements for VC businesses significantly and to increase liquidity at unprecedented levels, because VCs can sell their fungible reputation
- 4015908-006 : Fair launches shift capital formation from venture capitalism toward altruistic capitalism, because a digital asset startup that can successfully raise capital through a fair launch becomes less relia
- 4685567-037 : For venture capital funds, an impact certificate listing performs a due diligence function, because the follow on investor inherits all the project performance data generated through the impact certif