entity · derived
Voting rights
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying voting-rights. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1908473-006 : The second trigger, which increases voting rights before resolution, should fire on evidence that conversion into equity was unsuccessful, that conversion came too early or too late, or that the firm'
- 1908473-007 : Beyond super-voting rights and dilution, the second trigger functions as a reorganization tool that operates independently of management decisions and of corrective action by regulators.
- 1908473-024 : Departing from Coffee's design, super-voting rights should be allocated to contingent capital holders only if the first trigger failed to improve the institution's financial health; at the first trigg
- 1908473-025 : To balance constituent incentives and prevent abuse, the voting rights increase should be calibrated so that contingent capital holders obtain a majority stake only in combination with the largest ins
- 1908473-029 : Information asymmetries between market participants and a systemically important institution's management before default can be reduced if a financial weakening after conversion of contingent capital
- 1908473-030 : The second trigger voting rights increase should never actually be triggered; its function is to level the playing field between constituents, incentivize negotiation, and provide an alternative to re
- 1908473-031 : German corporate law permits increases in voting rights only in very limited circumstances, such as grandfathered multiple voting shares, so the proposed voting rights increase would require statutory
- 1908473-032 : Allocating super-voting stock to contingent capital holders satisfies Delaware's legitimate business purpose requirement, because the allocation serves to avoid insolvency and dissolution of the insti
- 1998455-021 : Where institutions hold each other's contingent capital and share similar risk profiles, they will be hesitant after conversion to vote for necessary organizational changes at a competitor or otherwis
- 1998455-022 : Absent cross holdings, the opposite conflict arises: institutions holding a competitor's converted contingent capital could be tempted to exercise their voting rights against the interests of that com
- 1998455-032 : A contingent capital design that increases voting rights on conversion allows systemically important institutions to lower risk taking implicitly and to achieve an indirect, institution specific form
- 1998455-033 : Because the threat of a change of control leads leaders to take fewer risks in order to avoid triggering conversion, a contingent capital design with increased voting rights allows those leaders to ac
- 1998455-034 : Management incentives for risk control are heightened upon conversion, especially where management knows that holders of converted contingent capital would command a majority vote, with or without ins
- 2061166-034 : A second, sequential trigger placed before reorganization or resolution cushions the risk that policy makers misstructure the first trigger, absorbing the negative effects of inadequate or untimely co
- 2922176-033 : It is feasible that in the not too distant future an artificial intelligence will hold an independent board seat with voting authority and be trusted to make smarter, data-driven choices than human di
- 2922176-036 : In a decentralized autonomous organization a series of smart contracts grants token holders voting rights, so the blockchain-based smart contract performs the function that articles of incorporation o
- 3067615-003 : ICOs cannot be qualified as donations and are therefore distinguishable from crowdfunding, because ICO participants acquire a financial stake in the company and, as the case may be, a right to vote on
- 3067615-019 : Token holders, unlike shareholders in the traditional corporate infrastructure, cannot vote for or against directors or nominate directors, so ordinary ICO investors have no governance channel and sim
- 3227933-032 : In a DAO, blockchain-based smart contracts granting token holders voting rights perform the function that articles of association or bylaws perform in a conventional corporation.
- 3799320-030 : In the bifurcated DAO of DAOs token design, non fungible reputation tokens give members voting rights while fungible reputation salary tokens let members earn a salary in proportion to their non fungi
- 4941807-031 : Membership in the proposed DAO is constituted by holding REP tokens, which carry voting rights and a share of DAO revenue, and because validation pools revalue REP dynamically the governance model ada
- 5454054-032 : Because Landreth holds that instruments carrying equity attributes such as dividends or voting rights are securities, LER rewards cannot include any such features and must function as independent loya
- 5583610-016 : Under Blasius, LER should function as a last-resort tool justified by evidence of severe harm to the corporation, such as an activist's documented history of value destruction, so that courts can test