failure family

other

31 claims across 7 works.

• asymmetric-regulation: Asymmetric hedge fund regulation, in which Dodd-Frank and the AIFM Directive regulate banks and hedge funds separately and differently, is counterprod
• protectionist-backlash: The AIFM Directive could create incentives for regulatory arbitrage and could provoke retaliatory action by countries outside the European Union.
• asymmetric-regulation-costs: Regulating entities that operate in the same markets under asymmetric rules creates legal uncertainty and significant transaction costs.
• regulator-resource-shortfall: If regulators lack the resources to protect against systemic risk, hedge fund regulation could be futile.
• regulator-information-leakage: Regulators who obtain hedge funds' proprietary information could inadvertently pass it to third parties, and because that information is highly valuab
• bailout-induced-monitoring-failure: Because banks expect to be bailed out with taxpayer funds, they may have less incentive to monitor their hedge fund lending activities, even though he
• ccrm-free-riding: Systemic risk and financial market stability are public goods, so individual banks free ride on other banks' hedge fund credit risk management and are
• depositary-withdrawal: Because the AIFM Directive exposes depositaries to strict liability in certain circumstances, depositaries must weigh the risks and benefits of servin
• retaliatory-escalation: Discrimination against non-EU jurisdictions under the AIFM Directive could provoke retaliatory action, and retaliation combined with a lack of intra-E
• non-exclusive-lending-relationship: A standard objection to indirect regulation is that counterparty credit risk management will not work effectively unless the lending bank has an exclu
• unforeseeable-compliance-target: Requiring advisers to adopt written policies to prevent and detect securities law violations presumes those violations are foreseeable, yet because Do
• inconsistent-conduct-and-effects-application: Before Morrison, U.S. courts refused to adopt a bright line rule for the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b), and the resulting case by case condu
• listing-based-reading-of-morrison: The plaintiffs' reading that Section 10(b) covers transactions anywhere in any security of a class listed on a U.S. exchange is inconsistent with Morr
• plaintiff-haven-effect: Permitting Section 10(b) suits over dually listed securities traded outside the United States would undermine Morrison's own policy rationale, because
• reference-security-equivalence-fallacy: The Porsche swap transactions were not the functional equivalent of a transaction on a U.S. securities exchange, but neither were they the functional
• reference-security-only-location-test: The economic reality of swap agreements does not justify fixing the location of the transaction in every case solely by reference to the market where
• private-transaction-location-gap: Morrison provides no clear parameters for classifying privately negotiated transactions as domestic or foreign, because the case involved publicly tra
• single-party-presence-test: If the presence of a single U.S. party sufficed to locate a privately negotiated derivative transaction in the United States, U.S. parties could sue i
• party-location-indeterminacy: Locating a private transaction by the location of the parties is often unworkable, because the parties are frequently institutions simultaneously pres
• broker-location-loophole: Treating the U.S. location of a broker as making the securities purchase domestic would circumvent most of the Morrison holding, since a foreign buyer
• third-party-swap-exposure: Porsche could be exposed to substantial U.S. sanctions even though neither its own common stock nor Volkswagen's traded in the United States, solely b
• derivatives-exception-to-morrison: If Section 10(b) were held to reach swap agreements based on stocks traded outside the United States, plaintiffs' attorneys would use that holding as
• jurisdiction-only-drafting-error: On its face Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act addresses only the jurisdiction of the district courts and does not expand the geographic scope of t
• unilateral-enforcement-risk: Section 929P(b) risks complications where the SEC proceeds unilaterally in situations in which coordinated enforcement with foreign regulators would b
• perceived-governance-encroachment: Expanded SEC enforcement under the Dodd-Frank provision runs a serious risk of being perceived as an encroachment on the corporate governance of forei
• foreign-operations-deterrence: Overuse of the Dodd-Frank extraterritorial enforcement provision by the SEC or the DOJ could deter foreign companies from having U.S. operations.
• Developer blindness to business and ethical context: Coders and developers do not always understand the industry or business environment they target with their software solutions, nor do they always cons
• remedy mismatch: The two sources of instability require different remedies and must not be swapped: dynamic rules are a mismatch for instability caused by the profit m
• Ethical collectivism corrupts reason: Appeals to individual sacrifice for a common good constitute ethical collectivism, which corrupts society and undermines the reason and rational thoug
• Manifest Without Economic Terms: At commit 2d920ce the manifest, the only contract a tool presents, contains no economic field: no price, no settlement address, no attribution declara
• Unreliable Institutional Reasoning: The second irreducible failure is the unreliability of logical reasoning: even within situations a specification describes, human institutions draw co