kaal:claim:1806252-031

Banks' role in monitoring hedge funds is not easily comparable to the principal agent problem between securities buyers and credit rating agencies, because banks have more influence over hedge funds than securities buyers have over rating agencies and their ratings.

Banks have perhaps more influence over hedge funds than buyers of securities over credit rating agencies and their ratings.

Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011), V.4 Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, p. 73
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1806252 · source PDF

Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252

mechanismsupport: arguedai-and-agentscorporate-governancesystemic-riskcompliancerisk-and-incentives

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