kaal:claim:2061166-001

Where bank resolution regimes are not coordinated across jurisdictions, the same systemically important financial institution can be handled in opposite ways: it might petition for reorganization under German law and emerge leaner and more competitive, while its United States operations are liquidated under the Boxer Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act.

it is possible that a SIFI with operations in multiple countries could petition for reorganization under German law, for instance, and emerge as a more competitive and leaner business while the same SIFI in the United States may be liquidated under the Boxer Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act.

Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012), I. INTRODUCTION, p. 6
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 · source PDF

Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

• SIFIs with operations in multiple countries
• absent coordination and convergence of resolution regimes

failuresupport: arguedfailure: Uncoordinated cross-border resolution of a single SIFIfamily: jurisdictional-conflictsystemic-riskregulatory-failure

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