failure family

jurisdictional conflict

35 claims across 14 works.

• collateral-law-circumvention: Even if the ECJ has embraced the incorporation theory, Member States can still frustrate Type B regulatory competition through tax law, capital market
• language-lock-out: Member States unwilling to incur the rule switching costs of conducting judicial proceedings in English could be precluded from marketing their corpor
• perceived-judicial-bias-premium: Fear of judicial bias operates through risk premiums: because investors and managers are uncertain how foreign judges will behave and may assume the w
• conflict-of-laws-escalation: Conflict of laws problems become more complex and pose a much greater threat to the entire system of regulatory competition once a jurisdiction market
• doctrinal-recharacterization: Member States can avoid at least part of the result in Centros and Inspire Art by recharacterizing what used to be corporate law as creditor protectio
• home-law-overreach: To the extent judges are biased toward expansively interpreting the reach of their own Member State's corporate law, corporations may unexpectedly be
• forum-selection-as-covert-opt-out: Choosing another Member State's courts as the forum can silently strip substantive rights: if the forum state treats an unavailable remedy such as mon
• unpredictable-jurisdictional-test: The Second Circuit's conduct and effect test was too unpredictable, and a clear rule keyed to the location of the securities transaction would be more
• global-arbiter-effect: Allowing foreign plaintiffs to sue foreign defendants in US courts over securities purchased and sold in foreign countries would turn the United State
• forced-export-of-us-law: Section 7216 could have the opposite effect of forcefully exporting US law onto other jurisdictions including Europe, even though it would be preferab
• dual-regime-uncertainty: Overlapping regulation and inconsistent legal rules create uncertainty, so that individual board members of European companies and their attorneys wil
• diplomatic-friction: Section 7216 could be one more impediment to good diplomatic relations if the United States is perceived as establishing its courts as international c
• counterproductive-unilateralism: Exporting and imposing rules through extraterritorial reach could be counterproductive not only for US diplomacy but also for international cooperatio
• trigger-manipulation-asset-stripping: Sequential triggers invite manipulation of the triggering events and abusive practices such as asset stripping near bankruptcy, a risk the contract or
• Uncoordinated cross-border resolution of a single SIFI: Where bank resolution regimes are not coordinated across jurisdictions, the same systemically important financial institution can be handled in opposi
• National-only crisis measures cannot reach cross-border operations: Purely national crisis measures proved ineffective during the financial crisis because they could not reach cross-border banking operations or contain
• Mutual recognition collapses national buffer discretion: Mutual recognition of countercyclical capital buffers hollows out the national discretion the Commission proposal appears to grant: the financially st
• National bridge bank residency requirement conflicts with EU law: The German Banking Act requirement that a bridge bank have its head office inside Germany is of highly questionable compatibility with European Union
• unstable-geographic-borders: Defined geographic borders for securities transactions, the overarching assumption behind Morrison, are an unstable basis for limiting the extraterrit
• enforcement-threat-as-settlement-leverage: Bifurcation lets a party to a disputed offshore transaction reintroduce U.S. law into the civil liability regime by threatening to involve the SEC or
• no-mans-land-transaction: Geographic tests create the risk of a no man's land transaction: defendants may persuade the courts of every jurisdiction that the transaction took pl
• chosen-law-not-applied: A contract selecting non-U.S. securities law can fail entirely: if the chosen jurisdiction's courts decline jurisdiction because the transaction did n
• jurisdictional-nonapplicability: Jurisdiction over the public blockchain does not exist within the present doctrinal infrastructure for jurisdiction, and in practice the blockchain ca
• location-based-jurisdiction-failure: Traditional jurisdictional tests fail for blockchain because the concepts of location and presence do not apply: the blockchain has no location, physi
• autonomy-defeats-jurisdiction: Even if every user and supporter of the blockchain and their locations were known, it would still not be possible to exercise jurisdiction in the trad
• registration-does-not-yield-jurisdiction: Uniform Law Commission style registration of virtual currency businesses may give courts more information about registered businesses, but jurisdictio
• anonymity-voids-personal-jurisdiction: Proving personal jurisdiction over smart contracting parties by physical presence, domicile or place of business, consent, or minimum contacts becomes
• Domicile-less funds and jurisdictional indeterminacy: A fund constituted purely through smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain may have no domicile, foreign or domestic, which makes jurisdiction over
• cybernetic jurisdictional escape: Applying a common legal anchor and traditional jurisdictional principles to cybernetic systems is near impossible, because the status of a cybernetic
• Jurisdictional non-capture: Cybernetic systems change constantly and are less amenable to jurisdictional reach, which makes it nearly impossible to apply a common legal anchor an
• Territorial Integrity Constraint: Experimentation with decentralized organizational forms of society is curtailed by the principle of territorial integrity of nation states, a foundati
• Jurisdictional Tax Assertion Drag: Governments will try to tax increasing distributed value creation wherever they can assert national jurisdiction, and exercising that assumed authorit
• centralized regulation of a supranational market: It is not possible to create a centralized regulator like the SEC for the decentralized economy, because doing so would place a supranational market u
• cross-jurisdictional fragmentation: Divergences between MiCA and U.S. regulation mean that a single LER compliance design cannot scale globally; tailored, jurisdiction-specific complianc
• Limits of unilateral AI regulation: Unilateral regulation of artificial intelligence by a single jurisdiction produces global ripple effects, but that approach reaches its limits because