kaal:claim:2267560-037

A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking: smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors in the competition to shape rules.

Source quote, verbatim
A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking. In the competition to shape rulemaking, smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups (such as dispersed investors) (Olson 1965).
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), IV.1 Optimizing the Learning Process, p. 11
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

Classification

mechanismsupport: evidencedfailure: special interest dominance in rulemakingfamily: regulatory-capture-and-incumbent-advantageinstitutional-designregulatory-failuredynamic-regulation

Related claims
Verify

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/7c0437082649fd01...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-037.md | sha256sum