kaal:claim:2273857-021

In the competition to shape financial policy through rulemaking, small and well organized special interest groups such as the financial industry dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors.

In the competition to shape policies and attain the most favorable conditions for themselves via rulemaking, small and well- organized special interest groups (such as the financial industry) dominate latent groups (such as dispersed investors).

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013), II. The Political Economy of Financial Regulation, p. 12
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

• ordinary, non-crisis periods

mechanismsupport: evidencedinstitutional-designregulatory-failureeconomics

• specializes kaal:claim:2267560-037 A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking: smaller and better organized special interest groups ...
• extended_by kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017 The inadaptability of stable and presumptively optimal rules intensifies competition between well organized sp...
• extended_by kaal:claim:2740477-028 Adaptive rulemaking reduces the collective action problem because with fewer stable rules, latent majority gro...

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