kaal:claim:3652481-036

Paying DevDAO salaries in fungible stable tokens in proportion to members' non fungible reputation scores makes the economic benefit indirect, which removes corruptive elements and makes the governance design more attack resistant and stable over the long run.

The salary payments in fungible stable tokens are in proportion to DevDAO members' respective non-fungible reputation token scores. The indirect economic effects remove corruptive elements and make the governance design more attack resistant and stable in the long run.

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020), IV.2.f DevDAO, p. 59
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

• a bifurcated token design with non fungible reputation tokens and fungible salary tokens

mechanismsupport: arguedrisk-and-incentivesreputationconsensus-and-security

• restated_by kaal:claim:3799320-031 Paying members indirectly, through a fungible stable salary proportional to non fungible reputation, removes c...
• restates kaal:claim:3441904-038 Optimized DAO governance should pay members only indirectly, through fungible salary tokens issued in proporti...
• extended_by kaal:claim:3799320-028 Reputation based staking removes the corruptive elements of fungible tokens because third parties are less lik...

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