entity · derived
Disclosure
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying disclosure. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1428387-032 : More disclosure does not always mean better governance, because the information provided may be hard to assess and evaluate.
- 1558614-031 : The United States compensates for its lenient corporate law treatment of risk taking under the business judgment rule with a comparatively strict disclosure regime and a robust securities class action
- 1558614-032 : In the United States the duty to disclose risk indirectly generates risk monitoring, because directors who know they are responsible for disclosing risk have reason to monitor it even though corporate
- 1558614-039 : Delaware courts have not explicitly imposed a duty to monitor risk, but that omission may be moot: because failing to disclose risk violates federal securities law, unmonitored risk is likely to becom
- 1664809-034 : If US law requires disclosure of information that another country's law prohibits from being disclosed, whether for privacy or other reasons, there could be a true conflict of law and a credible case
- 1806252-009 : Regulators who obtain hedge funds' proprietary information could inadvertently pass it to third parties, and because that information is highly valuable to competitors in the same markets, such leakag
- 1806252-010 : Because hedge fund trading strategies depend on confidentiality, required disclosures that let other market participants trade along or anticipate a fund's transactions can negatively affect the fund'
- 1806252-035 : Registering hedge funds with regulators and requiring disclosure of pertinent information could help minimize the moral hazard, social externalities, and systemic risk generated by the hedge fund indu
- 1908473-038 : Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define adequate information, prepackaged plans risk inadequate disclosure, creditor challenge, and unusable prepetition votes that force the case into the longer o
- 1998455-038 : Rather than banning purchases by systemically important institutions of each other's contingent capital, which could be detrimental to market evolution, the design should require disclosure of the pur
- 2150377-001 : Freedom from supervision and disclosure obligations was functional rather than incidental for hedge funds: it enabled successful fund launches, helped generate higher returns, and attracted investors,
- 2150377-007 : Under the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act, hedge funds with more than $150 million in assets under management must register as investment advisers and disclose information about thei
- 2317580-022 : Codes of conduct adopted under a CIA should encourage disclosure of compliance issues and protect whistle blowers from retaliation by maintaining the anonymity of disclosures.
- 2337268-018 : Registration is the gateway that makes data collection and enhanced disclosure by hedge fund managers possible, and the Dodd-Frank Act raised disclosure requirements for registered advisers specifical
- 2337268-043 : Referral fees to third parties are permitted only if the recipients are bona fide persons under securities laws, the fees are disclosed to the adviser's clients, and the fees are paid under a written
- 2389416-002 : Contrary to the hedge fund industry's claim that increased supervision and disclosure would harm profitability, the authors find statistical evidence that the Dodd-Frank Act requirements had a positiv
- 2389416-011 : The quarterly Form PF reporting obligation imposed on hedge fund advisers with more than $1.5 billion in regulatory assets under management is designed to give the FSOC timely data for identifying sys
- 2389416-040 : The SEC's collection of proprietary hedge fund data through Forms ADV and PF does not negatively affect the performance of the hedge fund industry as a whole, and appears to affect only a subset of th
- 2389423-009 : The new regulatory framework for private funds in the United States requires hedge fund manager registration in combination with enhanced disclosure of sensitive proprietary information, a combination
- 2389423-012 : Title IV mandates hedge fund adviser registration in order to increase record keeping and disclosure, requiring advisers above the statutory AUM threshold to register as investment advisers and to dis
- 2389423-013 : Registered investment advisers must report systemic risk relevant information to the SEC, including trading practices, trading and investment positions, the amount of assets under management, valuatio
- 2447306-005 : Prior scholarship, including the author's own earlier work, established that Form PF created core challenges for the private fund industry but did not clarify what impact the disclosure requirements a
- 2470008-004 : Even though the private fund industry broadly accepted Form PF, the form's core problems for the SEC are the ambiguity of several questions, advisers' disagreement with the definition of funds, and co
- 2470008-014 : Form PF data was tailored primarily for the FSOC rather than for the SEC's own purposes, a design choice that shaped the level of reporting required.
- 2470008-022 : The SEC itself reports that the consistency of investment advisers' responses on Form PF is not ensured and may be questionable.
- 2470008-024 : The SEC's initial analysis of Form PF data turned up anomalies attributed to filer error, which prompted SEC concern about the quality of the information private fund advisers report.
- 2470008-025 : Expanding the uses of Form PF data remains difficult so long as there is insufficient confidence in the accuracy of what advisers report, notwithstanding SEC efforts to improve quality through interpr
- 2470008-026 : Form PF data quality and utility are likely to improve over time as filers grow familiar with the form's requirements and calculation methods, because the SEC's experience with the data is still early
- 2470008-030 : The Form PF definition of Regulatory Assets under Management is the leading example of a definition that forced filers to interpret what they were required to report.
- 2470008-031 : The interpretation Form PF demands generated particular concern among filers about the definition of counterparties and about counterparty performance measures.
- 2470008-036 : Widespread filer disagreement with Form PF definitions implies that a large share of filers are uncertain how to answer, which raises the possibility that they complete the form with estimates and var
- 2470008-038 : Private fund advisers reporting under Form PF encountered issues that could affect the FSOC's systemic risk assessment, but the author does not claim that the FSOC is unable to fulfill its congression
- 2714974-007 : Under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, hedge funds with more than $150 million in assets under management must register as investment advisers and disclose information about their trades and portfolios
- 2714974-008 : Some of the most sensitive Form PF disclosures are not readily obtainable by the funds themselves: counterparty credit exposure often cannot be determined by individual fund managers, which makes the
- 2714974-012 : The most pressing problem with Form PF identified by the majority of SEC registered hedge fund advisers is not the volume of data but the ambiguity of the data reporting requirements themselves.
- 2714974-015 : Co-investment arrangements become problematic when a fund grants a co-investment opportunity in exchange for a future or increased fund commitment and the practice is not adequately disclosed, especia
- 2714974-022 : Neither obvious remedy for the increased sales pressure created by the Rule 506 amendment works well: added disclosure obligations such as filing all Rule 506 sales documents with FINRA or the SEC may
- 2714974-035 : SEC rules should be amended to require public companies, particularly financial institutions, to disclose their material exposure to hedge funds and other highly leveraged institutions in the MD&A or
- 2715083-003 : Mandatory registration and increased disclosure for certain hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act place hedge fund advisers under registration and reporting obligations similar to those long bo
- 2715083-011 : Private party litigation against hedge fund managers stays minimal because well counseled managers make extensive disclosures to investors who are presumed sophisticated, unlike mutual fund advisers w
- 2715083-025 : For the first time in the industry's history, the Dodd-Frank Act required most hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC, mandating disclosure of information previously treated as proprietary and p
- 2732915-010 : Form PF raised regulatory oversight of private funds to unprecedented levels by requiring managers to disclose, for the first time, information about themselves, their funds, their investors, performa
- 2732915-011 : Prior studies acknowledge that the SEC's mandated collection of private fund data through Form PF created several core challenges for the industry, but they do not sufficiently clarify the long-term i
- 2739479-003 : The reporting obligations imposed on private fund advisers by Form PF raised regulatory oversight of private funds to unprecedented levels.
- 2748096-026 : Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act addresses alleged hedge fund systemic risk through an information strategy rather than a substantive one: it authorized the SEC to require registration and enhanced disc
- 2811729-007 : Post-crisis legislation accelerated the convergence of mutual funds and private funds, because the registration and increased disclosure requirements the Dodd-Frank Act imposed on certain private fund
- 2811729-011 : The go anywhere features of unconstrained mutual funds impede a retail investor's ability to ascertain and understand what the fund is invested in and what risks those investments carry.
- 2811729-030 : It is questionable whether retail investors typically have the experience or training to fully appreciate the risks disclosed in unconstrained mutual fund prospectuses.
- 2811729-032 : Because an unconstrained mutual fund's performance is typically not assessed against any established benchmark, the retail investor must evaluate the fund without the contextual information routinely
- 2816408-020 : The absence of any statistically significant effect of mandatory disclosure on hedge fund returns suggests that the transparency costs associated with disclosure do not significantly affect the profit
- 2816408-032 : For much of its history the private fund industry has treated adviser registration and disclosure of proprietary information as a threat to its profitability, a view this study's evidence does not sup
- 2957645-030 : Information generated by contingent capital securities may allow regulators to adjust their regulatory requirements and the intensity of regulatory investigations anticipatorily rather than after the
- 2959730-026 : Blockchain based fund reporting substitutes verifiable transparency for hedge fund secrecy: the LendingRobot ledger shows detailed holdings and supplies a hash code signature as evidence that the data
- 2998097-011 : Under PFIARA, private investment fund advisers with more than 150 million dollars of assets under management must register as investment advisers and disclose information about their trades and portfo
- 2998097-012 : The private fund industry's central fear about Form PF was not the filing itself but eventual publicity: if the disclosures ever became public, competitors could reverse engineer fund strategies and l
- 3067615-005 : Because whitepapers are not audited by any authority, the preliminary steps of the ICO roadmap, project announcement, executive summary, and investor comments, carry the burden of building market cred
- 3067615-025 : ICOs provide the highest possible liquidity for investors at the very beginning of a platform's lifecycle, before the reporting, accounting, and legal infrastructure that gives the investing public as
- 3067615-037 : ICO promoters should not allow tokens to be traded before the underlying protocol network or application is live, and should not use a landing page that focuses almost exclusively on the ICO while pro
- 3067615-038 : ICO promoters should make significant and ongoing disclosures on vesting and lockup periods and should never manipulate the smart contract to change ICO sales rules mid-course during the offering.
- 3067615-039 : ICO disclosures should be as clear as possible: promoters should avoid an unclear or uncertain use of proceeds pie chart and should be very clear on plans for converting cryptocurrency into actual com
- 3117224-007 : The absence of mandatory disclosure requirements for ICOs leads many promoters to make irregular or no disclosures about the platform over time, producing a significant lack of transparency in the ICO
- 3117224-011 : Because ICOs give investors very limited assurances through upfront and continuous disclosures, the token market is highly volatile.
- 3117224-026 : In Australia, an ICO that falls under the Corporations Act triggers additional disclosure requirements, for example where the ICO constitutes a managed investment scheme.
- 3373393-027 : The removal of checks and balances, agent monitoring, audit requirements, disclosure regimes, market pressure, and executive compensation schemes produces a qualitative shift in efficiency in the agen
- 3405660-010 : Hedge fund disclosure to counterparties and investors relies on balance sheet concepts that are uninformative about the actual nature of market risk and credit risk exposures.
- 3405660-038 : Under an indirect approach hedge funds can remain exempt from disclosure and transparency requirements because only the financial intermediaries are required to reveal the relevant information, which
- 3606663-012 : The absence of mandatory disclosure obligations for ICOs leads promoters to make irregular disclosures or none at all as time passes, producing a significant lack of transparency in the ICO market.
- 3949098-038 : The key difference from the traditional venture capital model is that the DAOIC only makes its investment choices public and never provides investment analysis, so public co purchases are entirely vol
- 4033886-012 : Digital asset fund valuation disputes are aggravated by nondisclosure: Polychain Capital told a redeeming investor that the fund's asset valuation policy would not be disclosed.
- 4796714-019 : Mandatory AI use reporting fails as a transparency mechanism because it assumes accurate and complete disclosure, while regulated entities have incentives to underreport or misreport in order to avoid