entity · derived
Dodd frank
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying dodd-frank. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1558614-037 : The Dodd-Frank Act is notable for what it omits: it does not break up the largest banks, does little to help smaller and regional banks compete, and because compliance is burdensome and expensive may
- 1558614-038 : Dodd-Frank's mandatory risk committee is a significant change because most boards then delegated risk oversight to the audit committee, and it may generate new litigation if committee composition or a
- 1765901-021 : Unless courts can construe Morrison for swap agreements and other derivatives consistently with both the logic and the language of the opinion, Congress will have to enact new clarifying legislation.
- 1765901-023 : On its face Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act addresses only the jurisdiction of the district courts and does not expand the geographic scope of the substantive provisions of U.S. securities law.
- 1765901-024 : There is a substantial likelihood that U.S. courts will read the Dodd-Frank Act as giving some extraterritorial effect to SEC and DOJ suits, so Morrison cannot be expected to survive intact in actions
- 1765901-025 : Section 929P(b) may not have been necessary, because Section 10(b) already gives the SEC enforcement authority whenever a single U.S. securities transaction is affected by the alleged fraud.
- 1765901-027 : Read as more than a jurisdictional grant, the Dodd-Frank provision becomes an open-ended statute rather than the targeted authority the SEC already held under Section 10(b) and Section 30, and it is u
- 1765901-030 : Overuse of the Dodd-Frank extraterritorial enforcement provision by the SEC or the DOJ could deter foreign companies from having U.S. operations.
- 1765901-034 : Regardless of what the SEC study concludes, Congress should decline to reinstate private rights of action in foreign-cubed cases.
- 1765901-036 : Because of the ambiguities in Morrison and Dodd-Frank and the consequences of a broad reading for persons and companies in European and other jurisdictions, Congress should clarify its intent in Secti
- 1806252-004 : Asymmetric hedge fund regulation, in which Dodd-Frank and the AIFM Directive regulate banks and hedge funds separately and differently, is counterproductive.
- 1806252-009 : Regulators who obtain hedge funds' proprietary information could inadvertently pass it to third parties, and because that information is highly valuable to competitors in the same markets, such leakag
- 1806252-027 : Even combining hedge fund regulation via Basel III rules with the de minimis investment rules in Dodd-Frank could leave some issues open, and calibrating such a regulatory combination requires time an
- 1806252-033 : Requiring advisers to adopt written policies to prevent and detect securities law violations presumes those violations are foreseeable, yet because Dodd-Frank substantially changed securities law, the
- 1998455-025 : The political economy of financial regulation ensures that the expansion of regulatory oversight induced by Dodd-Frank will be followed by a phase of relaxation, since historically the introduction of
- 2061166-001 : Where bank resolution regimes are not coordinated across jurisdictions, the same systemically important financial institution can be handled in opposite ways: it might petition for reorganization unde
- 2273857-005 : Since 2002 United States corporate governance has been substantially upgraded twice in response to crises, following more than seventy years of comparative regulatory inactivity, a concentration of re
- 2273857-032 : Both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act were amended and revised, and some of their most controversial provisions were never enforced.
- 2273857-036 : The partial repeal of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley through the Dodd-Frank Act illustrates that broad rules enacted during times of political expediency are often later retracted.
- 2273857-038 : The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act exemptions for emerging growth companies from Section 404(b), from say-on-pay, and from pay ratio disclosure illustrate the post-crisis easing of constraints im
- 2317580-008 : Sarbanes-Oxley and the Dodd-Frank Act have influenced and shaped fiduciary duties, but they have not necessarily improved or clarified them.
- 2337268-018 : Registration is the gateway that makes data collection and enhanced disclosure by hedge fund managers possible, and the Dodd-Frank Act raised disclosure requirements for registered advisers specifical
- 2337268-029 : The Dodd-Frank Act added an inflation adjustment to the qualified client standard, requiring the SEC to adjust any dollar amount test within one year of enactment and every five years thereafter.
- 2337268-032 : The Dodd-Frank Act tightened custodial practice by requiring safeguards for client assets and verification by independent accountants, a response to concerns over theft and client exposure to Ponzi sc
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-025 : The common denominator between the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and other reform proposals is a top down regulatory approach of direct regulatory intervention with stable and supposedly opt
- 2389423-001 : This study finds no evidence of an inverse relationship between the size of regulated hedge fund advisers and the per-unit cost of compliance, contrary to the common complaint that financial regulatio
- 2389423-004 : Before Title IV, launching a hedge fund could be accomplished by raising roughly $25 to $50 million, whereas after the Dodd-Frank Act the required initial amount may have risen to around $100 million.
- 2389423-005 : Below $100 million in initial assets under management, the administrative cost of running a hedge fund in a post Dodd-Frank environment could be prohibitive.
- 2389423-015 : Prior work shows that registration and the increased compliance requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act only marginally increase the cost structure of hedge funds.
- 2389423-038 : There is no evidence that private fund adviser regulation in Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act increases returns to scale, which counters the most damning putative concern raised about regulatory complia
- 2447306-001 : Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and the SEC rules implementing it produced a paradigm shift in United States private fund regulation, raising regulatory oversight of an industry that had been largely e
- 2470008-015 : The FSOC's powers over nonbank financial institutions are broad and without precedent in United States financial regulation.
- 2714974-007 : Under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, hedge funds with more than $150 million in assets under management must register as investment advisers and disclose information about their trades and portfolios
- 2714974-009 : Contrary to the hedge fund industry's own predictions, the industry has absorbed Form PF quickly and the impact of the Dodd-Frank registration and disclosure rules has proven much less intense than th
- 2714974-010 : The majority of hedge fund advisers spent less than $10,000 preparing their initial Form PF data reporting to the SEC, and subsequent annual filings cost about half of that initial amount.
- 2714974-013 : The cost of hedge fund manager registration under the Dodd-Frank Act brings increasing returns to scale for the industry, meaning compliance burdens fall disproportionately on smaller advisers.
- 2714974-039 : The overall effects of enhanced hedge fund regulation are not as immense as industry representatives predicted, but there is evidence that the enhanced Dodd-Frank Act rules do increase compliance cost
- 2714974-040 : Higher compliance costs from hedge fund regulation can create barriers to entry for new market entrants and can accelerate consolidation of the hedge fund industry.
- 2715083-002 : Regulatory convergence is not driven only by tightened post crisis rules: the liberalization of advertising restrictions after the Dodd-Frank Act also pushes hedge funds toward mutual fund form, so de
- 2715083-003 : Mandatory registration and increased disclosure for certain hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act place hedge fund advisers under registration and reporting obligations similar to those long bo
- 2715083-025 : For the first time in the industry's history, the Dodd-Frank Act required most hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC, mandating disclosure of information previously treated as proprietary and p
- 2715083-028 : Confluence factors help move the hedge fund industry from the fringes of finance into recognition as part of mainstream finance, aided by increased oversight under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and t
- 2715083-031 : By tightening the accredited investor net worth standard, the Dodd-Frank Act pushes investors who lose eligibility for hedge fund investments toward hybrid and retail alternative funds, even if the nu
- 2715083-032 : The Volcker Rule cuts banks off from direct hedge fund investment and thereby pushes them toward accessing hedge fund strategies through retail alternative funds, a shift that could be substantial giv
- 2748096-010 : Any conclusion that hedge funds contributed to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 is circumstantial or anecdotal, because the data needed to test it, on leverage, counterparty relations, AUM, and portf
- 2748096-026 : Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act addresses alleged hedge fund systemic risk through an information strategy rather than a substantive one: it authorized the SEC to require registration and enhanced disc
- 2748096-028 : The SIFI designation regime does not reach hedge funds in practice: because the asset threshold is set high, at $50 billion or more in aggregate total consolidated assets, hedge funds are unlikely to
- 2957645-014 : Section 165(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act already authorizes the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to utilize contingent capital, so the mechanism has a statutory foundation in United States law.
- 2998097-015 : The second survey found long-term negative effects of Title IV: 34.9 percent of respondents expected it to affect the industry over the next five years through additional expenses, and 32.6 percent ex
- 2998097-016 : The SEC's efforts to clarify and optimize the post Dodd-Frank framework cut both ways: they supported industry compliance with the revised standards while simultaneously creating uncertainty and highe
- 2998097-020 : Using a regression discontinuity design around the 150 million dollar registration threshold with five years of performance data on more than 3500 reporting private funds, the study finds no significa