entity · derived
Incomplete contracts
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying incomplete-contracts. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2097160-002 : The methodological assumptions of incomplete contract theory improve the analysis of executive compensation arrangements relative to the classical and spot contract models normally used.
- 2097160-006 : Analyzing executive compensation as a single contract between an executive agent and a corporate principal fails, because it ignores the informal relational element of the principal agent relationship
- 2097160-007 : Control rights in executive compensation contracts cannot sufficiently constrain ex post opportunism by executives, because of incomplete information, information asymmetry, bounded rationality, limit
- 2267560-033 : Opportunistic behavior, transaction costs, and bounded rationality undermine comprehensive contracting, so contracting parties do not specify all of their respective obligations ex-ante because antici
- 2267560-034 : Contractual incompleteness can be lowered through dynamic processes within the rulemaking process, because dynamic elements improve the availability, timeliness, and quality of information via the fee
- 2267560-035 : The learning process in incomplete contract theory can be improved because experimentation with different rules, rule revision, and additional rulemaking create significant transaction costs, and post
- 2267560-041 : Contracting parties need to postpone the specification of obligations only if the feedback process in the dynamic framework did not generate sufficient information; where sufficient information is ava
- 2267560-044 : Parties in the incomplete contract model cannot adapt to unforeseen contingencies because they cannot specify ex-ante how those contingencies will be met, and transactions may be foregone or become to
- 2267560-045 : Dynamic regulation takes issue with the broad scope of contractual incompleteness and delayed decision-making assumed by the incomplete contract model, contesting the view that such incompleteness and
- 2267560-047 : The broad scope for contractual incompleteness and delayed decision-making stipulated by the incomplete contract model are necessary only if the feedback effect did not produce sufficient information
- 2267560-049 : Because dynamic regulation supplies information ex-ante via a feedback process before rules are finalized, certainty for involved parties is not affected ex-post after rules become effective, so contr
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-006 : Under incomplete contract theory the rulemaking process is itself a learning process, and incomplete contracts are the instrument that carries that learning.
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-007 : A core tenet of incomplete contract theory, that rulemakers should act only when sufficient information becomes available, is often politically, economically, and practically undesirable or impossible
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-029 : Because a governmental contract is executed only after wrongdoing has been identified and assessed, the parties can contract for governance improvements with relative precision, which reduces the amou
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-031 : Feedback processes associated with governmental contracts lower contractual incompleteness, because they raise the availability, timeliness, and quality of information while lowering the cost of contr
- 2992962-030 : Problems with smart contracts are inevitable because of subjectivity in human relationships, bounded rationality of coders and contracting parties, incomplete foresight, incomplete information, and op
- 3373393-008 : Because of bounded rationality, incomplete foresight, and information asymmetries, it is impossible for principals to contract for every possible action or inaction of the agent so as to induce the ag
- 3405401-011 : Smart contracts undermine the ability of counterparties to continue collaborating when unanticipated eventualities arise, because in most cases of unfulfilled parameters the smart contract will simply
- 3406323-033 : Smart contracts undermine the parties' ability to continue collaborating when unanticipated eventualities arise, because in most cases of unfulfilled parameters the contract will simply cancel out rat
- 3441904-013 : Unlike corporate governance systems, the decentralized nexus of incomplete smart contracts has no supply of majoritarian default rules to fill its gaps, and corporate law's default rules are largely i
- 3808852-009 : Because of human shortcomings, bounded rationality, incomplete foresight, and information asymmetries, it is impossible for principals to contract for every possible action or inaction of the agent so
- 5886442-016 : Where human contracts remain radically incomplete because parties cannot specify responses to all future states, AI2AI agents generate, evaluate and execute functionally complete contingent plans acro
- 5886442-017 : When hyper rational agents can write and execute complete state contingent contracts at negligible cost, the Williamsonian justification for hierarchical governance evaporates.
- 6269518-005 : No static citation protocol can eliminate all arbitrage opportunities for sufficiently patient and powerful actors, a conclusion the author draws from Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, the Folk Theorems
- 6269518-009 : The citation matrix functions as an implicit contract specifying value distribution whose precise terms cannot be determined with the precision the mathematical framework demands, which is an instance
- 6269518-010 : Citation weights should be treated as approximate signals of attribution rather than precise measurements, and the governance system must be designed to function robustly under that inherent imprecisi
- 6269518-031 : An evolutionary approach to citation standards is essential because the precise parameters of citation accuracy cannot be specified ex ante: what counts as adequate citation varies across expertise do
- 6421319-017 : The Williamsonian justification for hierarchical governance evaporates when hyper rational agents can write and execute complete state contingent contracts at negligible cost, because the firm was an