entity · derived
Investor protection
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying investor-protection. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1428387-026 : Because industry practices and informal rules already protect their relationships and investments, qualified investors may neither desire nor require extended investor protection rules to optimize hed
- 1428387-027 : Retail investors are more likely to benefit from investor protection rules that optimize hedge fund valuation, because their minority position in the industry, the absence of informal rules, and manag
- 1558614-028 : The EU's Market Abuse, Transparency, Markets in Financial Instruments and Prospectus Directives improved European securities regulation but still do not mandate coherent and comprehensive disclosure,
- 1664809-031 : Regardless of the relative merits of securities regulation in the United States and Europe, European investors are most likely to benefit if Europe addresses the problem of investor protection itself
- 2029983-034 : The race to the bottom objection to a contract based approach is weaker than assumed because a race to the bottom requires the consent of both buyers and sellers, and the objection assumes that buyers
- 2029983-040 : Although many jurisdictions may protect investors less well than the United States, it is not at all certain that U.S. law does a better job of deterring securities fraud.
- 2337268-002 : The IAA restricts the assignment of advisory contracts without client consent in order to protect investors against changes in the character or quality of the advisory services they contracted for.
- 2715083-011 : Private party litigation against hedge fund managers stays minimal because well counseled managers make extensive disclosures to investors who are presumed sophisticated, unlike mutual fund advisers w
- 2715083-012 : Hedge fund investors have almost no statutory remedy: the regime establishing a hedge fund investor's rights is severely limited, nearly to the point of nonexistence, in the United States and in the o
- 2811718-034 : The legal standards applicable to private fund investor due diligence are somewhat inconsistent and suboptimal and merit clarification.
- 2811729-001 : The proliferation of unconstrained mutual funds calls into question whether the retail investor protections built into the Investment Company Act of 1940 remain effective.
- 2811729-005 : The investor eligibility line has become arbitrary in the credit space: private funds implementing substantially the same investment strategy as a fixed income unconstrained mutual fund, and carrying
- 2811729-016 : If a private fund's offering process successfully limits its investors to accredited investors or qualified purchasers, the retail investor protection principles of the Company Act do not apply to the
- 2811729-029 : Reliance on prospectuses and other disclosures by an unconstrained mutual fund that in all material respects complies with the Company Act may be insufficient to protect retail investors.
- 2811729-031 : The broad investment authority of unconstrained mutual fund managers exposes retail investors to fluid trading and investing patterns that the average retail investor is unlikely to sufficiently appre
- 2811729-033 : Retail investors may be led to believe that unconstrained mutual funds are safe relative to other fixed income mutual funds precisely because they are marketed, offered, and regulated as mutual funds,
- 2811729-034 : A retail investor's experience investing in traditional mutual funds is likely to be a poor indicator of whether that investor will understand the risks of investing in an unconstrained mutual fund.
- 2811729-036 : The Company Act's retail investor protection policies do not take sufficiently into account the investment strategy and risk attributes that unconstrained mutual funds share with private funds.
- 2811729-037 : Given the risks to retail investors of investing in complex unconstrained mutual funds and the SEC's own concern about the retailization of private funds, it is unclear why the SEC has not acted to en
- 2811729-038 : The SEC should re-evaluate its reliance on the Company Act's disclosure regime in its current form as the best means of protecting retail investors from the risks of investing in unconstrained mutual
- 2811729-039 : The SEC continues to rely on disclosure as the means of mitigating investor risk from unconstrained and other mutual funds irrespective of the complexity of those funds' portfolios and strategies.
- 2998033-013 : The SEC's reasoning against the Bitcoin exchange traded fund does not transfer to blockchain based private investment funds, because such funds trade a diverse array of cryptocurrencies rather than Bi
- 2998097-010 : Investor suitability standards requiring independent verification of an investor's ability to evaluate complex financial products and investment risk would make wealth redundant as a proxy for sophist
- 3067615-010 : To avoid a token price crash, token escrow accounts should provide usage and access controls that assure investors escrowed tokens will not be issued at a discount, and lockups or phased releases of e
- 3067615-018 : The 2012 to 2017 ICO model allowed cryptocurrencies to be raised through a token sale without any conditions, landmark requirements, or security measures to protect investors, so that in essence promo
- 3067615-019 : Token holders, unlike shareholders in the traditional corporate infrastructure, cannot vote for or against directors or nominate directors, so ordinary ICO investors have no governance channel and sim
- 3067615-023 : Because the token supply is controlled by ICO promoters who must reserve tokens for future funding needs, token holders can be diluted by later issuance of reserve tokens and their token value can be
- 3067615-032 : Identifying legitimate projects and distinguishing them from scams is a necessary condition both for investor protection and for creating the conditions in which ICOs can proliferate.
- 3117224-005 : Unlike shareholders in traditional corporate structures who can vote for or nominate directors, ICO investors have no control whatsoever over promoters.
- 3117224-006 : Capped ICO raises, adopted to address investor uncertainty about platform valuation in uncapped raises, backfire by creating strong incentives for investors to get in first and thereby raising the lik
- 3117224-007 : The absence of mandatory disclosure requirements for ICOs leads many promoters to make irregular or no disclosures about the platform over time, producing a significant lack of transparency in the ICO
- 3117224-008 : ICO promoters can alter the smart contract to change the sales rules mid-course during the ICO.
- 3117224-010 : ICO investors have no preemptive rights or other anti-dilution protections, so they may be diluted if promoters later issue more reserve tokens to additional investors.
- 3117224-011 : Because ICOs give investors very limited assurances through upfront and continuous disclosures, the token market is highly volatile.
- 3117224-012 : Token holders typically receive no liquidity preference protecting them if the platform they invested in goes bankrupt or terminates.
- 3396522-021 : Extreme illiquidity combined with the herd mentality of crypto investors systematically benefits speculators, because it lets apparent scarcity materialize out of nowhere precisely when investors are
- 3405660-001 : Direct hedge fund regulation faces a two sided trap: strong direct rules push hedge funds offshore where they escape regulation altogether, while weak rules leave investors without adequate protection
- 3411110-025 : The SEC has developed neither blockchain-specific offering disclosure standards nor retail investor protection measures particular to blockchain based offerings, leaving issuers without guidance.
- 3606663-011 : Capped ICO raises, adopted by the crypto community to reduce investor uncertainty about platform valuation in uncapped raises, backfire because the cap creates strong incentives for investors to get i
- 3606663-012 : The absence of mandatory disclosure obligations for ICOs leads promoters to make irregular disclosures or none at all as time passes, producing a significant lack of transparency in the ICO market.
- 3606663-013 : ICO sale terms are not fixed at launch: promoters can alter the smart contract to change the sales rules mid course during an offering, a risk factor for retail investors that has no analogue in a reg
- 3782216-025 : Centralized securities bureaucracies are slow to update their regulations, so those regulations often hurt the very people they were designed to help.
- 4033886-009 : The absence of digital asset valuation standards generates uncertainty and confusion for both investors and managers, and the industry would be better off with uniform standards.