entity · derived
Special interests
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying special-interests. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2267560-037 : A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking: smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors in the competition to shape rul
- 2267560-038 : During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, temporarily overcoming the predominance of special interest groups in
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008 : Because rulemaking is subject to regulatory cycles and to a classic collective action problem, rules are generally not enacted at the moment appropriate information for rulemaking becomes available.
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017 : The inadaptability of stable and presumptively optimal rules intensifies competition between well organized special interest groups and latent groups, because inadaptable outcomes raise the stakes for