entity · derived
Game theory
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying game-theory. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 3402701-011 : The Folk Theorems of game theory imply that no matter how complicated a stable coin protocol becomes, a powerful and patient player has strategies to subvert the system and profit at the expense of th
- 3406323-040 : For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes there is a way to subvert the rules for individual profit at the expense of the group, a result the author attributes
- 3411897-040 : For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes, there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group, which is why static dece
- 3782192-017 : The Folk Theorems of game theory prove that any rules that can be formally set down can be subverted: strategies always exist that follow the rules and still allow a minority player to profit at the e
- 3782193-011 : No set of written rules can be made complete: the Folk Theorems demonstrate that however rules are written, strategies exist that follow those rules yet profit the individual at the expense of the gro
- 3782193-031 : Honesty would be the wrong strategy for an agent if the contract were anonymous and its resolution did not affect future contracts, because that situation is a single-stage zero-sum game in which stea
- 3782193-032 : Adding reputation to the contracting game converts it from a single-stage zero-sum game into a repeated positive-sum game in which the rest of the community becomes relevant, because reputation is a f
- 3782203-020 : For any game, a new assumption can be added that generalizes the game so that the previous winning strategy becomes a losing strategy and a new winning strategy arises; the authors offer this as a met
- 3782205-008 : Keeping decentralized networks running productively requires a dynamic design with checks and balances combined with the incentive design insights of game theory.
- 3782214-001 : Reputation changes the incentive structure of a decentralized organization from a single stage, zero sum game into a repeated positive sum game, which is why the authors treat reputation as the key to
- 3782217-006 : A DAO that relies on a centralized oracle will eventually be exploited, because the people controlling the oracle will become aware of their power over automated contract triggers and, given the compe
- 3782217-032 : From a game theory perspective the open source culture advocated in the Web3 movement is not sustainable in the long term unless it is married with a culture of respect for history.
- 3782217-037 : Review changes the game theoretical perspective from a single stage game to a repeated game, which produces more efficient cooperation instead of internal competition and is what makes the open source
- 3782220-004 : Transcendental values are necessary for long-term stability because every formal, explicitly specified protocol is permanently exposed to strategies that subvert it, a result the authors draw from the
- 3799320-035 : Charging an admission fee disincentivizes betrayal and defection, because the sunk cost of joining makes cheating expensive when rejoining would also be expensive even under anonymity.
- 3981021-032 : Charging an admission or denial of service fee to become a voting associate disincentivizes betrayal and defection, because the sunk cost of joining makes cheating expensive even where associates can
- 5225296-021 : Slashing establishes a Nash equilibrium in which rational validators adhere to honest behavior, because the expected cost of penalties exceeds any short-term gain available from misconduct.
- 5225296-032 : Weighted voting creates a Nash equilibrium favoring honest participation, because creating additional Sybil identities yields no extra voting power absent corresponding contributions.
- 5225296-037 : Collusion calls for a different remedy than Sybil attacks: adaptive slashing that detects coordinated deviations through statistical anomaly detection is what deters group manipulation.
- 5886442-024 : Nash's model, by presuming homo economicus unbound, overestimates human computational capacity and perpetuates a normative ideal that distorts policy and institutional design by justifying frictionles
- 6192998-014 : The 2018 framework contained a citation graph concept, but its mathematics were underdeveloped and no game theoretic analysis established incentives for honest citation.
- 6192998-024 : Citations should be mandatory and constrained to sum to one, which prevents arbitrary weighting, and citation honesty should be established as a game theoretic equilibrium rather than assumed.
- 6192998-030 : Honest ranking strictly dominates strategic ranking for validators whenever the reputation gain from consensus alignment matters, so truth telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
- 6269518-007 : Under the standard citation-weighted payment formulation the dominant strategy for a self-interested agent is to cite no one and maximize self-attribution, which is the precise negation of honest know
- 6269518-013 : Existing proofs that validators have a truth-telling equilibrium for quality ranking do not establish that job-performing agents have incentive-compatible strategies for honest citation, because these
- 6269518-032 : Theorem 3b holds that under the integrated solution honest citation is a Nash equilibrium when validators assess citation accuracy and the marginal effect of citation accuracy on the honesty score exc
- 6269518-040 : Because the analysis rests on the Nash equilibrium concept, it does not rule out coordinated under-citation among colluding groups; coalition-proof equilibrium analysis is needed to address that possi
- 6421319-028 : Contrary to the author's own prior version of this argument, Nash equilibrium does not become irrelevant in the AI2AI economy; it becomes simultaneously more accurate as a description of individual ag