entity · derived
Incentives
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying incentives. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1664809-013 : If section 7216 becomes law and permits extraterritorial application of US antifraud provisions, it would further incentivize forum shopping by plaintiffs' attorneys.
- 1806252-031 : Banks' role in monitoring hedge funds is not easily comparable to the principal agent problem between securities buyers and credit rating agencies, because banks have more influence over hedge funds t
- 1998455-040 : Contingent capital can facilitate an incentive structure that lets regulators rely partially on private party contracting for the design of these securities while still accounting for systemic risk.
- 2029983-023 : By approving U.S.-style fee arrangements, the Converium decision adds an important incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring claims in the Netherlands.
- 2097160-015 : Regulatory triggers insufficiently incentivize executives to lower risk, because executives would not have to self-monitor and adjust their own risk-taking preferences in order to avoid the trigger.
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-020 : If the liability standard were lowered, directors and officers would take their increased personal liability exposure into account and could be incentivized to engage in less risky behavior.
- 2389416-029 : The Dodd-Frank Act registration threshold creates incentives strong enough that some advisers opt out of registration and disclosure by strategically changing their AUM size to stay below $150 million
- 2486570-023 : Because the board changes mandated by non and deferred prosecution agreements consist largely of additional reporting obligations and committee reform rather than removal of officers or directors, tho
- 2486570-024 : The threat of bad press, reputational harm, legal costs, stock price declines, and the cost of implementing mandated governance changes can partly substitute for the weak direct incentives, pushing bo
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-028 : If governmental contracts increasingly mandate replacement of boards and senior management, boards will have stronger incentives to make preemptive remedial measures effective.
- 2714974-037 : The prohibition on performance fees for investment companies is the most important structural difference from hedge funds, which rely heavily on performance fees of up to 20 percent of capital gains a
- 2715083-017 : Alternative mutual funds generally cannot deliver the same absolute returns as hedge funds, a shortfall some attribute to the lighter touch regulation and better incentives available to hedge funds.
- 2715083-029 : Merging the regulatory requirements of mutual funds with the formerly distinct rules for hedge funds creates incentives for private investment managers to launch retail alternative funds, which raises
- 2715083-038 : Rising demand for alternative strategies creates incentives for mutual fund managers to find ways to simulate leverage, in an industry that historically used little leverage and presented little risk.
- 2811718-025 : Fund managers were incentivized to route capital to Madoff because he charged notoriously low fees for the hedge fund business, taking only transaction fees rather than fees based on assets under mana
- 2811729-027 : Unconstrained mutual funds take on private fund-like risk without a corresponding return advantage: private funds' incentives and investment flexibility help explain their performance advantage over m
- 3002908-016 : In the decentralized DLT model, distributed consensus replaces the trusted central validation system, substituting cryptographic solutions and economic incentives for a central validator.
- 3071378-016 : Promoted minorities do not necessarily use their new position to promote other minorities; in the existing American corporate structure they often have incentives to race to the top while lifting the
- 3071378-017 : Top management retains support only so long as others in the corporate structure keep them in power, which gives incumbents an incentive to keep upper management composition unchanged.
- 3402701-039 : Commonly held expressions of organizational values are essential to designing and implementing any governance structure and are far more important in decentralized organizations, which inherently have
- 3405660-012 : Banks continue to find hedge fund business desirable because hedge funds take risks other participants will not, borrow heavily and pay a premium for borrowing, which sustains the lending relationship
- 3782198-017 : The Apache Foundation's minimal governance works only because its members are not competing for power and money within the organization, which limits how far the model can be transferred to for profit
- 3782205-021 : Reputation rather than money is the proper motivator of good behavior in business and governance, because properly accounting for reputation switches incentives from short-term zero-sum thinking to lo
- 3782210-001 : Reputation, not money, is the proper incentive for motivating the most efficient cooperation and long-term stability in business.
- 3782210-005 : Reputation converts a transaction from a single-stage zero-sum game into a repeated positive-sum game by holding out the promise of future business opportunities, so the value created is the improved
- 3782210-041 : Without the promise of improving reputation, a zero-sum mentality dominates a contractual arrangement and each party's best strategy becomes exerting the absolute minimum effort while still technicall
- 3782217-006 : A DAO that relies on a centralized oracle will eventually be exploited, because the people controlling the oracle will become aware of their power over automated contract triggers and, given the compe
- 3782217-029 : Reviewers in a news review DAO will give honest reviews despite being paid fees, because the reputational system rewards members mostly on the basis of future fees rather than present ones.
- 3782217-033 : The solution to the game theory problem of getting a player to freely give up intellectual property at one stage of a repeated game is to guarantee a reward at a future stage by fostering a culture th
- 3782217-036 : Reviewing through references enables punishment and reward in DAOs, which shifts members' motivation away from immediate rewards toward the future and encourages delayed gratification and sacrifice fo
- 3782220-009 : A society that levels material outcomes completely undermines its own equity: eliminating all individual reward crushes the meritocratic instinct, power is allocated inefficiently to those who cannot
- 3808859-018 : Open source contribution is governed by a cost-benefit calculation rather than pure altruism: the volunteer's opportunity costs of forgone paid work must be offset by satisfaction, autonomy, peer reco
- 3949098-026 : Misjudging the public commitment portion of a firm underwriting engagement would neutralize the liquidity the DAOIC previously gained through reputation staking.
- 3962614-007 : Deal evaluation and risk assessment in traditional venture capital is fraught with inaccuracies and suboptimal incentives.
- 3995709-036 : The CRDAO governance framework is the decentralized governance framework developed by Craig Calcaterra and Wulf Kaal, further enhanced and implemented by the code review DAO, and CRDAO members get pai
- 4067783-004 : Fundraiser DAOs are structurally fragile because they typically lack incentives for meaningful community engagement, so they dissipate once the hype that created them fades.
- 4067783-029 : A meaningful reputation governance and accounting mechanism for motivating business and governance participation is what encourages mutually beneficial contributions to a DAO community.
- 4529715-005 : Work to earn is the strongest of the six scored categories, yet it still averages only 4.9 out of 10 across the DAOs studied.
- 4941807-031 : Membership in the proposed DAO is constituted by holding REP tokens, which carry voting rights and a share of DAO revenue, and because validation pools revalue REP dynamically the governance model ada
- 5095633-005 : The current data production market cannot scale or sustain a high-quality text supply because content creators face limited incentives and no direct compensation structures.
- 5095633-024 : Smart contracts that release payment automatically once preset quality thresholds are met reduce human error, cut administrative overhead, and accelerate data-labeling cycles relative to intermediated
- 5887242-020 : Tight coupling creates an exponential penalty for contrarian positions, since a participant staking ten percent of reputation against consensus risks total loss of that stake while correct majority st
- 6192998-004 : Because most reputation systems treat each contribution as atomic and independent, they cannot capture the cumulative knowledge graph, and the result is systematic undervaluation of foundational work
- 6192998-017 : When foundational work earns no downstream credit, the contributor's optimal strategy shifts to hoarding knowledge or publishing only when full value can be captured personally.
- 6655138-007 : An architecture with an action surface but no reward channel implements generation as an unrewarded act, so rational agents will not allocate compute to generation beyond the level their own selection
- 7596939-032 : The dual-use result is conditional rather than general: sufficient sanctions, norms, shared collateral, review and repeated success fees all fall outside it, and it governs only the incentive half of