entity · derived
Regulatory cycles
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying regulatory-cycles. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1998455-025 : The political economy of financial regulation ensures that the expansion of regulatory oversight induced by Dodd-Frank will be followed by a phase of relaxation, since historically the introduction of
- 2273857-001 : Governance adjustments enacted via stable rules in reaction to financial crises are inevitably followed by relaxation, revision, and retraction of those rules.
- 2273857-005 : Since 2002 United States corporate governance has been substantially upgraded twice in response to crises, following more than seventy years of comparative regulatory inactivity, a concentration of re
- 2273857-006 : The existing literature on financial regulation has not adequately addressed the underlying causes and consequences of cyclical regulation.
- 2273857-014 : The regulatory sine curve itself may be inevitable, but its costly and suboptimal regulatory effects can nonetheless be limited.
- 2273857-020 : Financial regulation is characterized and controlled by a classic collective action problem, and as a consequence regulatory oversight is never constant.
- 2273857-022 : During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, which temporarily overcomes the predominance of special interest grou
- 2273857-023 : Once crises recede, regulatory oversight diminishes as societies and markets return to their prior equilibrium, and this dichotomy causes reform legislation and deregulatory legislation to be enacted
- 2273857-026 : The cyclical nature of public rulemaking under incomplete information and bounded rationality is costly and produces suboptimal regulatory outcomes with long-term implications for financial markets an
- 2273857-027 : Regulatory cycles make it nearly impossible to address financial regulatory concerns adequately, and systemic risk in particular is difficult to address if rules are enacted in a cyclical and reactive
- 2273857-028 : The regulatory sine curve is the pattern of governance adjustments made in reaction to financial crises together with the inevitable relaxation, revision, and retraction of the rules enacted as part o
- 2273857-029 : Regulatory intensity is never constant: it increases after a market crash and then wanes as society and the market return to normalcy.
- 2273857-041 : Business and regulatory cycles will persist, but optimizing the relationship between indicators of financial crises and the regulatory sine curve, especially the timing of regulatory responses, could
- 2273857-046 : Regulatory cycles would benefit from supplementing, rather than replacing, the existing regulatory framework with dynamic elements.
- 2273857-066 : A mixture of mandatory rules, market solutions, and private ordering would increase the adaptive capabilities of rulemaking, curtail the effects of the collective action problem of rulemaking, and dam
- 2273857-067 : Adding dynamic elements to financial regulation would cause the sine curve of financial regulation to start its upward slope before the occurrence of financial crises, thereby dampening regulatory cyc
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-004 : Dynamic elements function as an economizing device: they address the scarcity of regulatory resources and lower the cost of rulemaking by curtailing the collective action problem in rulemaking, the re
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008 : Because rulemaking is subject to regulatory cycles and to a classic collective action problem, rules are generally not enacted at the moment appropriate information for rulemaking becomes available.
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-013 : The existing framework of stable and presumptively optimal rules is self reinforcing: it perpetuates rulemaking processes that produce stable presumptively optimal rules and therefore keeps generating
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-018 : Costly regulatory cycles become less likely if the regulatory framework integrates dynamically adapting elements, because rule revisions, revocations, and reenactments become less necessary.
- 2740477-024 : Accepting suboptimal rules temporarily buys rule certainty and predictability but guarantees a later cycle of revision, amendment, and repeal, so rulemakers trade short term certainty for a costly cor
- 2740477-026 : Exponential innovation will intensify the frequency of the regulatory sine curve, because rulemakers are still trying to comprehend the regulatory demands of the last wave of innovation while the next
- 2740477-027 : The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial and error rulemaking, and regulatory cycles all derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules rather than
- 2808132-020 : The historically evolved rulemaking infrastructure could cope with its own collective action problems, regulatory cycles, and trial-and-error rulemaking without major disruption because the scope of r
- 2808132-028 : The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial-and-error rulemaking, and the problems of regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules
- 2808132-030 : Regulatory cycles and trial-and-error rulemaking become less prevalent under adaptive rulemaking because adaptive capabilities supplement stable rules, making rule revisions less frequent.