entity · derived
Stable rules
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying stable-rules. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2267560-025 : Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution-specific information.
- 2273857-008 : Congress, financial regulators, and the financial regulation literature rely almost exclusively on rules presumed to be stable and optimal, which is the common denominator of regulatory responses to c
- 2273857-010 : A regulatory framework that relies exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules cannot adequately address future challenges, and the amendments, revisions, and retractions such a framework ge
- 2273857-043 : Dynamic regulation is the antithesis of static, stable, and presumptively optimal regulation, and it is intended to counterbalance the effects of stable and presumptively optimal rules rather than rep
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-002 : Stable rules may not suffice to make directors' oversight role more robust, so contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance are a promising supplement for improving the duty of oversight.
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-025 : The common denominator between the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and other reform proposals is a top down regulatory approach of direct regulatory intervention with stable and supposedly opt
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-026 : Governance adjustments made through stable rules in reaction to a systemic shock can result in suboptimal governance outcomes, market volatility, and economic loss.
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-029 : The economic conditions and the corresponding requirements for optimal and stable rules are constantly evolving, so rules fixed at one moment lose their fit over time.
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-031 : The shortcomings of stable rules, especially the perpetual need for rule enactment and revision, justify a supplemental dynamic approach to regulating the financial industry that enhances and extends
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-034 : Dynamic Regulation may enable regulators to anticipate future changes and challenges and to adapt stable rules accordingly.
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-035 : Using court decisions and stable rules to make the oversight role more robust could be insufficient, whereas contractual and quasi law forms of dynamic governance could help improve the duty of oversi
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-016 : The shortcomings of the existing rulemaking framework cannot be adequately addressed from within that framework, because its structure rests on the assumption that rules ought to be stable and presump
- 2740477-017 : The existing regulatory infrastructure, including Congress, agencies, self regulatory bodies, and the regulation literature itself, relies almost exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules.
- 2740477-018 : If rulemakers cannot adequately protect their constituents through stable and presumptively optimal rules, then regulatory supplements that facilitate anticipatory rulemaking are justified.
- 2740477-024 : Accepting suboptimal rules temporarily buys rule certainty and predictability but guarantees a later cycle of revision, amendment, and repeal, so rulemakers trade short term certainty for a costly cor
- 2740477-025 : The current process of rule revisions, amendments, and repeals used to fix the inevitable shortcomings of stable rules is costly, time consuming, and in the authors' estimation cannot keep track of fu
- 2740477-027 : The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial and error rulemaking, and regulatory cycles all derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules rather than
- 2740477-032 : The existing framework for optimal rules is self reinforcing: it perpetuates rulemaking processes that produce more optimal rules requiring costly revision, updating, and revocation, so suboptimal rul
- 2808132-002 : Ex post facts-based, trial-and-error rulemaking combined with stable and presumptively optimal rules often produces suboptimal regulatory outcomes, and those outcomes are no longer sustainable in an e
- 2808132-016 : The ex post facts-based approach to rulemaking worked historically because the optimal requirements for rules only become clear once stable and presumptively optimal rules have already emerged as subo
- 2808132-018 : Stable and presumptively optimal rules are created to address regulatory issues that lawmakers perceive through centralized information under then-existing economic and market conditions, and are draf
- 2808132-019 : Because rulemakers are increasingly unlikely to be able to protect the public through stable and presumptively optimal rules alone, regulatory supplements that enable anticipatory rulemaking become ju
- 2808132-026 : Despite their insufficient anticipatory capabilities and known downsides, stable and presumptively optimal rules remain the uniform response to perceived regulatory issues.
- 2808132-028 : The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial-and-error rulemaking, and the problems of regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules
- 2831040-008 : Rulemakers rely almost exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules meant to be permanent solutions, and that reliance ignores the ever changing rule environment driven by exponential growth
- 2831040-010 : An existing regulatory infrastructure built on stable and presumptively optimal rules is largely incapable of addressing the ever increasing unknown future contingencies associated with disruptive inn
- 2831040-036 : Rules operate as a feedback effect on the rulemaking process itself: rules with suboptimal characteristics result from institutional arrangements and then reinforce those suboptimal arrangements, and
- 2957645-004 : The existing regulatory infrastructure, resting on stable and presumptively optimal rules, is largely incapable of addressing the unknown future contingencies associated with disruptive innovation.
- 4796714-025 : Strict legacy regulation built on stable and presumptively optimal rules and enforced at the AI development stage can inadvertently stifle innovation by imposing rigid constraints before a model is fu