entity · derived
Voting design
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying voting-design. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 3441904-014 : The core governance failure of the original 2016 DAO was its inability to create dynamic governance protocol upgrades in real time through dynamic feedback loops, because its voting structure was buil
- 3441904-015 : Curators were the core point of centralization in the original 2016 DAO because the smart contract could not on its own distinguish real from fake proposals, leaving curators with approval and vote pr
- 3441904-021 : A one token one vote mechanism in existing decentralized protocols with on chain governance resembles a plutocracy, because holders of a significant share of total token supply hold more power than th
- 3441904-023 : In delegated proof of stake protocols the significant block validation power of elected nodes leads to corruption, because those nodes are incentivized to bribe voters to be elected as delegates in ex
- 3441904-041 : Reputation based staking removes the corruptive elements of fungible tokens from voting because third parties are less likely to be able to take over a non fungible asset that is organically grown and
- 3441904-044 : DAO member reputation should be designed as inflationary rather than as a permanent stock, so that non use such as non staking or non voting leads to value depreciation.
- 3652481-030 : The one token one vote designs popular in the early 2020s produced suboptimal voting outcomes because they allocate more power to holders of a large share of total token supply, leaving majority holde
- 3652481-031 : Reputation based staking removes the corruptive elements of fungible tokens because a third party is less likely to be able to take over a non fungible asset such as reputation that was organically gr
- 3652481-034 : Where a DAO's internal voting mechanism is centralized and burdened with legacy voting problems, any higher degree of decentralization achieved in its external legal design will typically be cancelled
- 3709041-017 : Under a quadratic style microdemocratic allocation, each voter receives a capped number of votes to distribute by priority, so voters concentrate votes on the issues most relevant to them and outcomes
- 3782214-030 : Loosely coupled voting, in which staked reputation cannot be lost, encourages dissenting opinions, while tightly coupled voting, in which losing stakes are redistributed, guarantees consensus; a DAO s
- 3808867-015 : Microdemocratic vote allocation improves voting outcomes because the proportion of votes a voter allocates to an issue evidences that voter's higher level of knowledge on the issue, and voters are unl
- 3808867-016 : Microdemocratic systems must solve the tragedy of the commons, because without controls self interested voters acting independently of the totality of voters may deplete or spoil shared resources such
- 3808867-017 : Majority rule in microdemocratic systems can produce discrimination against minorities, because a majority that is itself unaffected by a rule it instantiates can impose a discriminatory impact on a m
- 3981021-024 : Merit in the CHARITYxDAO is expressed by a non fungible reputation token that cannot be bought or sold, and voting is designed around staking those non fungible reputation tokens.
- 3981021-026 : Every CHARITYxDAO decision runs through a two vote model: a loosely coupled sentiment vote with no reputation at stake, followed by a tightly coupled final vote with reputation at stake.
- 3981021-027 : Because voting associates can see the sentiment vote outcomes and who staked what reputation before the binding vote, it is reasonable to expect that the overwhelming majority of final tightly coupled
- 3981021-028 : Reputation staking overcomes the polarizing effects and suboptimal vote outcomes produced by one token one vote voting mechanisms.
- 4685567-025 : Weighted reputation voting has key advantages over WEB2 and WEB3 one token one vote mechanisms because it aligns each donor community member's individual incentives while simultaneously calibrating th
- 5254152-014 : High governance scores require explicit mechanisms that prevent common governance failures, specifically the tyranny of the majority and the tragedy of the commons, such as reputation based voting, mu
- 5254152-031 : Procedural governance safeguards such as two step voting with temperature checks do not produce genuine decentralization when the governance token remains purchasable; in MakerDAO's case the purchasab
- 5254152-039 : A tiered voting system that combines temperature checks with token holder percentage thresholds robustly defends a DAO against common attacks, as reflected in Arbitrum's attack resistance score of 8.