entity · derived
Governance design
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying governance-design. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 3402701-039 : Commonly held expressions of organizational values are essential to designing and implementing any governance structure and are far more important in decentralized organizations, which inherently have
- 3441904-010 : Dynamic power organization in a DAO succeeds only if the decentralized governance structure motivates token holders to collaborate productively by fairly rewarding development, work, and the policing
- 3441904-019 : Corruption is possible whenever actors in a governance design can be identified, and every historical instantiation of institutional governance design involving identifiable humans was afflicted by co
- 3652481-021 : The identity of actors in a DAO governance design typically creates corruptive elements, and merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.
- 3652481-026 : Stable and presumptively optimal static or constitutional rules for DAO governance typically enable gaming and arbitrage opportunities, because rational opportunistic parties will circumvent complex s
- 3652481-027 : To avoid the corruptive gaming and arbitrage that static complex DAO rules invite, effective DAO governance designs should be focused on dynamic elements, including members' ability to re evaluate exi
- 3782192-016 : No static set of logical rules can ever succeed in preventing corruption, which is the ultimate problem with relying on letter of the law governance instead of spirit of the law governance.
- 3782192-019 : The second necessity for long-term stability is that the organization hold to its ideals and transcendental values, so that the spirit of the law overrides the letter of the law.
- 3782192-020 : Governing by transcendental values, ideals that everyone understands but no one can concretely attain, reduces members' motivation to probe the limits of acceptable behavior and therefore reduces the
- 3782193-014 : An ideal DAO with open membership for anonymous members from any culture can maintain harmony only if its members share a transcendental value, work toward a common purpose even if that purpose is sim
- 3782193-019 : The lesson the authors draw from Imperial China and Pharaonic Egypt is that decentralization of power and individual autonomy give long-term stability when the society also has unifying ideals it can
- 3782193-040 : In designing governance for large global networks, protocol centralization is necessary in order to display objective fairness, yet that same protocol centralization leads to instability, which is the
- 3782214-003 : Every governance process ever implemented is flawed, and no perfect governance system is possible even under very minimal assumptions such as non dictatorship; the goal must therefore be practical and
- 3782214-010 : Designing a single consensus algorithm is vastly easier than designing a consensus algorithm that can incorporate all future updates to itself, which explains why immature decentralized systems lack s
- 3782214-011 : A decentralized network needs a constitution that separates powers into a legislative system which updates the constitution, an executive system which enforces it, and a judicial system which resolves
- 3782214-017 : The engineering assumption that such problems can be entirely avoided through perfect system design is naive: exceptions will always exist because business competition always seeks optimal solutions t
- 3782214-020 : The very explicit rules that unify a diverse group destabilize it over the longer term, because internal corruption and external change render a fixed rule structure ineffective or inefficient.
- 3782214-021 : A for profit, open, diverse valued organization run under rigid Rule of Law is maximally unstable, so powerful stabilizing forces must be added to its governance rather than assumed.
- 3782214-027 : The two sources of instability require different remedies and must not be swapped: dynamic rules are a mismatch for instability caused by the profit motive, and a reputational system is not an efficie
- 3782220-006 : Building secure walls with well-designed doors is the proper way to embody conservative and liberal values together in an economic system: walls protect the group from the Tragedy of the Commons and m
- 3782220-025 : Identifying a network's values is not an academic exercise: values determine goals, goals determine how rewards and punishments are set up, and that reward structure determines the network's future an
- 3782220-026 : Governance design choices must be matched to the network's values, because otherwise the reward structure will dictate the true goals and thereby determine what the network actually values.
- 3799320-015 : The identity of actors in a DAO governance design is itself a source of corruption, so merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.
- 3799320-025 : In any open and democratic system, naturally opportunistic rational parties will attempt to circumvent and game the applicable complex static rules to increase their share of power and profit.
- 3799320-026 : Because static complex DAO rule sets bring inevitable corruptive gaming and arbitrage behavior, effective DAO governance designs should focus on dynamic elements such as members' ability to re-evaluat
- 3808873-035 : DAO governance designs of the early 2020s failed to take account of the historical precedent on governance, and most DAOs used centralized master nodes to institute blockchain protocol and DAO upgrade
- 3808873-039 : One token one vote on chain governance produces plutocracy: it allocates more power to holders of a significant share of supply so that majority token holders have more power than all other holders co
- 4067783-014 : Defending a DAO against attackers and looters, and punishing self-dealing, requires sustainable decentralized governance built on non-fungible tokens rather than tradable voting power.
- 4067783-016 : The author rejects the claim that DAOs are ungovernable: the shortcomings are real, but ongoing experimentation with DAO governance designs is gradually identifying workable decentralized governance s
- 4067783-017 : Workable DAO governance should account for reputation with non-fungible tokens or weighted keys rather than fungible tokens, so that voting weight tracks reputation instead of purchasing power.
- 4067783-018 : DAO governance should use a two vote model that distinguishes a loosely coupled vote, where no reputation is at stake, from a tightly coupled vote, where the voter's reputation is at stake.
- 4067783-019 : Reputation in a DAO should be generated only for long term valuable work and for the policing of work, and never for business development work.
- 4067783-023 : Effective human-centric DAO governance is the remedy for rigid smart contract rules that undermine business activities requiring more flexibility in web3 and the metaverse.
- 4067783-025 : The friction generated by anonymous trolling can be mitigated through incentivized reputational architecture governed by protocols the community itself decides on, so anonymity does not have to corrup
- 4067783-033 : Braintrust demonstrates that innovation in work structure does not cure governance design: despite redefining work outcomes, it uses a suboptimal one token, one vote model that grants proportional con
- 4529715-013 : Unlike corporate founders, who inherit a known governance template, DAO founders must build a new form of governance from nothing alongside their technology, mission, and values.
- 4529715-026 : Many DAO platforms accept the idea that they must first build a centralized organization and decentralize later once proper protocols are in place, but this mindset undermines the power and accessibil
- 4529715-033 : Locking voted tokens for a period after a vote, as Nexus Mutual does for three days, prevents an attacker from using a flashloan to borrow a large amount of wrapped tokens and swing a vote with signif
- 4796714-016 : Decentralized governance structures impose their own costs: with no central authority to coordinate diverse stakeholders, consensus is difficult to reach, negotiations are prolonged, and enforcement o
- 4796714-030 : Transparency and accountability cannot be assured across all participants in a federated governance model because there is no centralized control, and the author declines to advocate centralized contr
- 4855607-022 : The acyclic property of WDAGs is load bearing for governance rather than incidental: because loops and cycles are impossible, the progression of governance rules stays unambiguous and the framework ca
- 4855607-023 : Assigning weights to the edges of a governance WDAG lets the system prioritize some governance elements over others, which is how stakeholders are guided to the most relevant and impactful information
- 5095633-033 : Reputation for AI dataset governance must be multi-dimensional rather than a single numeric score, which the author operationalizes as weighted nodes and directed edges in a WDAG.
- 5887242-009 : A reputation-based staking system sits at the core of the UDLC DAO's internal governance precisely because it eliminates the corruptive influence of fungible tokens and plutocratic one-token-one-vote
- 6269518-010 : Citation weights should be treated as approximate signals of attribution rather than precise measurements, and the governance system must be designed to function robustly under that inherent imprecisi
- 6269518-012 : Leaching parameters can and should be calibrated to balance competing incentives, rewarding honest attribution while retaining enough skin in the game to deter frivolous or strategic references.