entity · derived
Principal agent
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying principal-agent. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1428387-021 : The principal-agent problem in complex financial products is exacerbated by hierarchies in financial institutions, which create multiple layers of agency relationships between the traders using the pr
- 1428387-024 : The issuer-buyer relationship and the incentives inside it are unlikely to be able to adequately control the principal-agent relationship between issuer and rating agency so as to ensure accurate rati
- 1806252-031 : Banks' role in monitoring hedge funds is not easily comparable to the principal agent problem between securities buyers and credit rating agencies, because banks have more influence over hedge funds t
- 1908473-010 : Contingent capital offers only limited protection against information asymmetries, principal and agent conflicts, and collective action problems, so it cannot by itself prevent economic failure.
- 1908473-011 : Existing proposals for implementing contingent capital do not explain how they would address the information asymmetries and principal and agent problems that may lie at the core of the credit crisis.
- 2097160-006 : Analyzing executive compensation as a single contract between an executive agent and a corporate principal fails, because it ignores the informal relational element of the principal agent relationship
- 2097160-007 : Control rights in executive compensation contracts cannot sufficiently constrain ex post opportunism by executives, because of incomplete information, information asymmetry, bounded rationality, limit
- 3441904-003 : Because blockchain guarantees prevent any participant from circumventing the coded set of governance rules, a lower level of oversight and monitoring of agents is needed, which changes the cost struct
- 3782210-040 : The Maghribi traders show that reputation alone can sustain a decentralized network under extreme information asymmetry: using only handwritten letters, Jewish merchants built a reputational system sp
- 3808867-013 : Elected representatives are incentivized to maintain their own power of office rather than to vote for outcomes reflecting the presumptive wishes and needs of their constituents.
- 3808873-042 : A decentralized human backstop to code is a core and often overlooked infrastructure requirement, because without it the immutability of the blockchain and its cryptographic security may not create ge
- 3949098-018 : Meaningful reputation in a business network removes the need for monitoring cost and lowers transaction costs by orders of magnitude.
- 3949098-021 : Traditional underwriting also fails at the agent level, because individual agents within an underwriter may sacrifice the underwriter's overall reputation for personal gain, for example by putting out
- 3949098-022 : In the theoretical model, the incentive design of decentralized reputation staking governance aligns the individual with the group so tightly that the agent cannot gain personally at the expense of th
- 3962614-014 : Because traditional VCs need to defend their investment choices to their own investors, they are often reluctant to invest in digital asset startups that have little history or sales records.
- 4067783-030 : Traditional work in centralized structures is prone to extrinsically motivated engagement, which intensifies principal agent problems and produces suboptimal outcomes because a principal dictates wher
- 5886442-032 : Principal agent frictions reemerge in new forms in the agentic economy, as user sovereign bring your own agents compete with platform controlled bowling shoe agents, creating incentives for proprietar