Kaal claims by topic: empirical-evidence

311 atomic, individually citable claims from the published work of Wulf A. Kaal tagged empirical-evidence.

Empirically, at least 48 companies with German names carrying the GmbH designation were formed as private limited companies under U.K. law in the ten months after the Inspire Art decision, indicating that charter migration accelerated after the ruling. 2004
Valuing thinly traded assets with exchange quotes is unsound because the price for less frequently traded assets may not indicate fair market value at the time of valuation, yet nearly a quarter of surveyed funds relied exclusively on such quotes. 2009
State Blue Sky investment adviser registration exemptions are not by themselves sufficient to explain retailization or to justify the absence of data on it; they only indicate theoretically how previously unqualified investors could gain access to hedge funds. 2009
Regulating on the basis of retailization would not currently be justifiable, because retailization cannot be quantified with any degree of certainty and regulation premised on speculation without proof or data validation would probably produce inadequate results. 2009
Foreign cubed cases in US courts rose over the decade preceding 2010, and in 2008 the number of such cases exceeded any previous year. 2010
Relative to the total number of US securities fraud and securities class action cases, foreign cubed cases are still relatively rare, although there was a substantial increase in them in 2008. 2010
British Bankers' Association data show that since 2000 hedge funds steadily increased their share of the credit derivatives market while banks' role in that market progressively declined. 2011
This Article reports the first survey study of hedge fund advisers conducted after the SEC's registration effective date, drawing on a population of 1267 private fund advisers who registered before March 30, 2012. 2012
The hedge fund industry's concern with confidentiality and privacy is itself an obstacle to empirical research: it made obtaining a substantial effective sample size for this study difficult, independent of the survey design. 2012
Persistent multi-channel follow-up, by fax, e-mail, and telephone, yielded ninety-four completed surveys, a 7.42% response rate from a population of 1267, which is substantially higher than response rates in prior surveys of this industry. 2012
Mandated disclosure does not automatically produce usable public data: although Form ADV requires advisers to disclose chief compliance officer contact information, the SEC dataset omitted it and contained no e-mail addresses, so researchers could not reach the officers responsible for compliance. 2012
The standard remedies for selection bias are not reliably corrective: simulation studies show that many techniques used to prevent selection bias problems have mixed success rates, can worsen rather than improve estimates, and may skew results under ordinary circumstances. 2012
A treatment and control design is unavailable for studying registration effects, because managers who did not have to register have no exposure to the treatment and therefore cannot generate informative responses about its effects. 2012
Comparison of the responding sample against the full registered population on Form ADV parameters shows the sample is not biased toward any particular subgroup of hedge fund advisers, and gives no indication that respondents differ from nonrespondents. 2012
Advisers responded to Dodd-Frank registration mainly through administrative and advisory adjustments: the most common actions were outsourcing compliance work, hiring additional counsel, instituting new record keeping policies, hiring additional staff, changing marketing materials, and changing investor communications. 2012
Structural and portfolio level responses to registration were rare: only a minority of respondents severed an advising relationship, changed a fund's legal structure, liquidated positions, changed investment styles, changed portfolio structure, or closed funds to new investors. 2012
A majority of surveyed advisers, 72.09%, do not plan any strategic response to the Dodd-Frank Act registration and reporting requirements. 2012
Compliance with the registration and disclosure requirements cost a majority of surveyed advisers between $50,000 and $200,000, while a significant minority estimated total compliance cost from $200,000 to over $400,000. 2012
The time burden of complying with all federal rules applicable to hedge fund advisers has a median of 500 hours per year, with three quarters of respondents at 750 hours or less and a quarter above that, so the burden distribution is skewed rather than uniform. 2012
The regulatory regime does not drive fund sizing for most advisers: 82.02% of respondents would not take the current regulatory regime into account in determining the assets under management size of their funds. 2012
Among the minority of advisers who do factor regulation into fund sizing, the pressure runs in both directions: about 25% would go smaller to avoid regulatory hassle while about 50% would grow or need a certain size to cover the increased expenses. 2012
The Form PF quarterly reporting threshold of $1.5 billion in assets under management is not a binding sizing constraint for most advisers: 80.46% would not take it into account in determining fund size, while 19.54% would. 2012
Where the Form PF quarterly reporting threshold does influence behavior, it distorts fund size downward: a majority of the advisers who take the threshold into account plan to stay under $1.5 billion in assets under management, and some would close funds to new investors to do so. 2012
Registration and disclosure costs had not reached investors at the time of the survey: 76.09% of respondents reported that their investors' rate of return was not affected, while 23.91% believed investors would be affected. 2012
The incidence of Dodd-Frank compliance cost falls on the management company rather than the fund: the responses indicate that the management company bears the brunt of registration and disclosure costs, and whether and how those expenses will be passed to investors over time is unclear. 2012
Of the respondents reporting an effect on management company profits, 87.50% attributed it specifically to increased costs and decreased profits caused by the registration and reporting requirements. 2012
Registration and disclosure did not push advisers to change what they invest in: only 2.44% of respondents said they would have to change strategy significantly over five years, while 4.88% expressly reported no strategy change. 2012
Respondents identified the creation of barriers to entry as an industry level effect of the registration and disclosure requirements, because the rules make the market environment for private funds less attractive to new entrants. 2012
The compliance burden has raised the minimum viable scale for launching a hedge fund: an adviser reports that the capital needed to start a fund in New York rose from roughly $25 to $50 million to at least $100 million because of the increased cost of compliance with the registration and disclosure requirements. 2012
Prior surveys of hedge fund manager expectations left the central questions unanswered because they were fielded before the registration effective date and used substantially smaller samples, so they measured anticipation rather than experience. 2012
Despite documented cost concerns, the hedge fund industry appears to be only modestly affected by the Dodd-Frank reporting and disclosure requirements and is adapting well to the new regulatory environment. 2012
Strategic adjustment to registration is a function of firm size: firms that planned a strategic response to Dodd-Frank were smaller than firms that did not. 2012
The study's findings are bounded in time: because the data was collected within three months of the registration effective date, the study shows trends and perceptions but does not provide insights on the long-term implications of the registration and disclosure requirements. 2012
The anecdotal record of ethically questionable conduct by leaders of systemically important financial institutions is not dispositive and does not establish an underlying trend, but it does show that some of the most pervasive cases of unethical conduct involved such institutions. 2012
Coupon rates between seven and nine and a half percent attracted sufficient investor interest in European contingent capital securities to establish what appears to be a sustainable market in those securities. 2012
Courts often provide very specific language about the standard of conduct expected of directors, but lawyers do not sufficiently communicate that expected conduct to directors. 2013
Almost 300 deferred prosecution agreements have been executed since 2003, whereas before 2003 they were rarely used. 2013
Hedge funds' distressed and default debt investments in the United States grew dramatically over two decades, rising from roughly $70 billion in 1998 to roughly $867 billion in 2007. 2013
The proliferation of distressed-focused hedge funds gave hedge funds roughly one quarter of the total distressed-debt market and made the distressed-focused approach the fifth-largest hedge fund strategy. 2013
More research and empirical work is needed to determine how CIAs and other hybrid forms may change or expand directors' obligations. 2013
Contrary to the hedge fund industry's claim that increased supervision and disclosure would harm profitability, the authors find statistical evidence that the Dodd-Frank Act requirements had a positive effect on hedge fund performance. 2014
Hedge fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act positively affects adviser returns in March 2012, but the effect does not persist in the months after the registration effective date. 2014
The working sample consists of 2,145 hedge funds drawn from Morningstar data on roughly 7,000 hedge funds and more than 3,700 advisers, retaining only funds reporting complete monthly earnings and AUM from January to October 2012. 2014
Only about a fifth of the sample funds exceed the $150 million AUM registration threshold: roughly 79 percent of the 2,145 funds are below it, 17 percent are consistently above it, and 4 percent float across it. 2014
In simple linear regressions of monthly returns on log AUM across the full sample, the AUM coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level only during March through August 2012. 2014
Adding a dummy for AUM above $150 million to the linear regressions leaves no variable significant at the 5 percent level in March 2012, and the dummy is significant only in April 2012. 2014
The March 2012 discontinuity coefficient is the only estimate with a p-value below 5 percent; all subsequent monthly estimates are statistically insignificant. 2014
Unlike the entire sample, whose discontinuity coefficient is near zero except in March 2012, the strategic subsample shows a discontinuity coefficient that is always above zero across the sample months. 2014
The study's most important limitation is data availability: the preliminary findings rest on only ten months of hedge fund adviser earnings data. 2014
The difference-in-differences interaction term identifying treated funds in 2012 is positive and statistically significant in March, April, and May 2012. 2014
Over 97 percent of the non and deferred prosecution agreements executed in the United States between 1993 and 2013 contained governance changes, including required business changes in 30 percent and board and senior management changes in 38 percent. 2014
More than 60 percent of the non and deferred prosecution agreements executed between 1993 and 2013 were preceded by preemptive remedial measures instituted by the corporate wrongdoer. 2014
Preemptive remedial measures have a low success rate, as evidenced by the fact that more than 60 percent of deferred and non prosecution agreements executed between 1993 and 2013 refer to preemptive remedial measures that preceded them. 2014
Prior scholarship, including the author's own earlier work, established that Form PF created core challenges for the private fund industry but did not clarify what impact the disclosure requirements actually have on managers; this study is designed to fill that gap. 2014
High quality private fund data is scarce because the industry's entrenched interest in confidentiality combined with decades of regulatory exemption from registration and transparency requirements left no reservoir of comparable disclosure to study. 2014
Enlarging the sample does not cure selection bias in non-statistical sampling: a bigger sample neither compensates for the bias of non-statistical techniques nor guarantees that the sample is representative. 2014
Further randomization of the sample was not available as a remedy, because respondents drawn from outside the private fund adviser population would never have been exposed to the new disclosure requirements and so could say nothing about them. 2014
The near identity between respondents who reported completing Sections 2 through 5 of Form PF and respondents who reported quarterly filing shows the answers are internally consistent, which the author treats as evidence that the survey responses carry above average reliability. 2014
Despite contacting the entire population of 3669 SEC-registered private fund advisers by fax and e-mail over more than five months, the study obtained only 52 respondents, a response rate of 0.014 percent. 2014
Advisers themselves understand Form PF's purpose the way the statute frames it: most respondents identified assessing systemic risk and closing the historical information gap about private funds as the form's purpose. 2014
Initial Form PF compliance was inexpensive for most filers: 59.18 percent of respondents put the total cost of completing Form PF for the first time under $10,000. 2014
Form PF compliance cost is sharply size dependent: quarterly filing large funds spent on average $155,286 on the initial filing, roughly sixteen times the $9,520 average reported by annually filing smaller funds. 2014
Measured against this study's survey data, the SEC marginally overestimated the cost of the initial Form PF filing for both annually filing smaller advisers and quarterly filing larger advisers. 2014
Recurring Form PF cost is also size dependent: quarterly filing large fund advisers pay on average $72,143 for subsequent filings while smaller advisers spend on average $5,262. 2014
The SEC's time burden estimates for Form PF are miscalibrated in the same direction as its cost estimates for large filers: the study's data suggest the agency overestimates the hours larger private fund advisers need. 2014
Form PF compliance is not staff intensive for most filers: 67.35 percent of respondents used only one to three individuals and 69.39 percent reported the work took staff less than 50 hours. 2014
The Form PF burden is concentrated in a few identifiable items: respondents ranked Question 16 on types of investors as the most time consuming, followed by Question 17 on performance and Question 7 on related persons. 2014
The dominant driver of Form PF time consumption is data gathering rather than form completion: 36 percent of respondents named data gathering as the task consuming most of their time, followed by delta options and ambiguous questions or unclear instructions. 2014
Asked what the SEC should fix first, respondents named the burdensome nature and the ambiguity of Form PF as the most pressing issues, not the substance of what is disclosed. 2014
Complaints about Form PF's ambiguity coexist with acceptance of its substance: the same majority that flagged ambiguity as the most pressing issue also considered their existing reporting systems adequate and agreed with the SEC's definitions and instructions. 2014
Form PF's definition of leverage is overinclusive: respondents reported that it is inappropriately constructed and sweeps in funds that use neither leverage nor derivative securities. 2014
Regulatory assets under management is an unstable reporting concept: commenters split evenly on whether Form PF's RAUM questions required them to interpret the term in order to answer. 2014
Contrary to the industry's public complaints about SEC support, a majority of respondents rated the best level of SEC staff guidance available for completing Form PF as sufficient or good. 2014
Where SEC guidance failed, the failure was localized: respondents who found guidance inadequate pointed predominantly to Form PF Section 1c, Item B, which concerns information about the reporting fund. 2014
SEC flexibility in answering Form PF questions is valued by filers: 72.92 percent of respondents said the flexibility the SEC provides is helpful. 2014
Most private fund advisers did not need new infrastructure to comply: 65.22 percent reported that their existing internal reporting systems adequately capture the information Form PF requires. 2014
For a substantial minority, existing systems fail Form PF for a specific reason: 34.78 percent of respondents said their internal reporting systems were insufficient because the required answers demand further analysis and calculation beyond what the systems already produce. 2014
Form PF's counterparty disclosure proved far less burdensome in practice than anticipated: 93.75 percent of respondents encountered no difficulty identifying counterparties for the counterparty credit exposure questions. 2014
Because only 27.08 percent of respondents used a service provider to complete Form PF, the widespread concern that outside service providers would overinterpret required Form PF data on filers' behalf appears unjustified. 2014
Working with a service provider imposes its own costs: filers reported that the arrangement requires investing time and money to develop interaction processes and bearing the burden of supplying the provider with the underlying information. 2014
Investor demand for Form PF filings is limited: 74.47 percent of respondents had never been asked by an investor for a copy of their Form PF filing. 2014
Form PF fund performance metrics are not accurate or comparable across filers, because reporting entities employ different calculation methodologies to produce them. 2014
Respondents argued that the SEC's systemic risk objective would have been advanced more directly by asking a smaller set of targeted questions, emphasizing open derivatives positions, the entity's total market exposure, and its total underlying capital. 2014
The measured effect of Form PF data reporting on the private fund industry is milder than the pre-adoption debate predicted. 2014
The study's cost findings are bounded to the short run: the data cannot establish what it will cost the private fund industry to keep completing and filing Form PF annually or quarterly over time. 2014
Prior scholarship on the corporate governance effects of non and deferred prosecution agreements rests largely on anecdotal evidence and individual case studies rather than on systematic evidence, which is why its conclusions about those effects are unreliable. 2014
Because the population of executed non and deferred prosecution agreements is now large, their real trends and real governance impact are quantifiable and measurable, so policy makers can be given evidence based guidance rather than conjecture. 2014
Coding of all publicly available non and deferred prosecution agreements executed between 1993 and 2013 shows that 97.41 percent of them, or 264 of 271 agreements, contained relevant corporate governance changes. 2014
In 63.47 percent of the coded non and deferred prosecution agreements the agreement itself referenced preemptive remedial measures the corporation had instituted before the agreement was executed. 2014
Where coded categories such as cooperating, disclosure, and internal review fall well short of 100 percent of the sample, the shortfall may reflect a gap in what the agreements record rather than a real absence of those corporate actions, so the coded frequencies understate actual conduct. 2014
Waiver of rights provisions are the most prevalent governance term in the sample, appearing in 96 percent of agreements, followed by cooperation with the government at 91 percent and improved compliance programs at 75 percent. 2014
The less prevalent categories of governance change mandated by non and deferred prosecution agreements are increased monitoring at 46 percent of the sample, board changes at 38 percent, business changes at 30 percent, and senior management changes at 30 percent. 2014
Cooperation requirements appear in 91.10 percent of the sampled agreements, and within that category document production requirements, meaning the identification, assembly, organization, and production of relevant documentation for the Department of Justice, appear in 79.70 percent of agreements. 2014
Although 45 percent of sampled agreements required improved communication and training, only 11 percent required the entity to create the position of chief compliance officer, so the most structural compliance remedy is the rarest. 2014
The trend in attorney client privilege waivers reversed after 2008: agreements requiring no privilege waiver increased steadily from 2008, and provisions requiring an attorney client privilege waiver disappeared completely by 2009. 2014
Because 63.47 percent of the sampled agreements were executed even after the corporation had already instituted preemptive remedial measures, the current quantity, quality, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of those preemptive measures may be insufficient to prevent an agreement. 2014
The governance trends reported in this study apply only to corporations that actually executed an agreement, so because a disproportionately large number of corporations self correct or self report instead, the findings may capture only the tip of the iceberg. 2014
Corporate governance provisions in non and deferred prosecution agreements increased significantly over the decade to 2013, raising prosecutors' influence over corporate governance to unprecedented levels. 2014
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act more than doubled the market entry threshold requirements for smaller hedge fund advisers. 2014
Because the distribution in this sample is heteroscedastic, treating each data point equally would allocate inappropriate weight to data points in the distribution, which is why the author used robust and weighted regression specifications. 2014
Selection bias is a valid concern in this study because of the lower sample sizes available for Models 1 through 5. 2014
The analysis uses data from a 2012 survey study of a population of 1,264 private fund advisers registered before the SEC's registration effective date for private funds of March 30, 2012. 2014
In the open ended survey question on the effects of Title IV, 43.59 percent of respondents, the largest group, said the industry would be affected predominantly by increased costs. 2014
The majority of survey respondents believed that Title IV compliance costs $100,000.00 annually. 2014
The most common fund adviser response, at 47.67 percent of the 86 respondents to the question, estimates the annual compliance cost of Title IV in the range of $50,000 to $100,000. 2014
On the median annual time measure for Title IV compliance, 46 percent of respondents estimated between 100 and 250 hours per year and 32 percent estimated between 250 and 500 hours per year. 2014
All regression models show positive and predominantly statistically significant coefficients, with 18 out of 30 coefficients in the entire sample statistically significant. 2014
The findings of this study are based on limited data and a small sample size, so additional research is required to fully investigate the impact of Title IV on the private fund industry. 2014
Prior studies and anecdotal evidence indicate that the data collection mandated by Form PF could itself create problems for the FSOC when it evaluates hedge fund systemic risk. 2014
National regulators reached opposite conclusions on the same question: unlike the OFR, FSB and IOSCO, the United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority concluded from its first comprehensive survey of London's hedge fund industry that the industry poses no systemic risk. 2014
More than forty percent of respondents in a prior study disagreed with the definitions or instructions in Form PF. 2014
The study's hand-selected dataset covers all institutions that executed N/DPAs from 1993 to 2015, a population of 330 agreements, of which 94 involved publicly traded firms usable for stock price tests. 2015
This is the first study to examine stock price reactions to non- and deferred prosecution agreements, using all publicly available N/DPAs across several industries from 1993 to 2015 (N=330). 2015
The study's results may be biased toward low impact N/DPAs, because firms that were acquired, merged, or went bankrupt as a result of an N/DPA had to be dropped for lack of public trading data, and those are precisely the highest impact cases. 2015
The findings rest on a small sample and limited data, so they should be treated as provisional pending replication on a larger set of publicly traded N/DPA firms. 2015
The existing literature has barely engaged the financial market implications of N/DPAs, which is the gap this study fills. 2015
Unconstrained mutual funds differ from traditional fixed income mutual funds not only in trading strategy, using futures, short sales, and derivatives, but also in turnover and fee structure, which more closely resemble those of hedge funds. 2016
Using self-reported Morningstar earnings data for 3,424 US private fund advisers covering 2010 to 2015 in multiple regression discontinuity designs with robustness checks, private fund adviser registration and disclosure under the Dodd-Frank Act had no significant effect on private fund adviser returns. 2016
Surveys of private fund managers conducted in 2012 and 2015 show that a clear majority of managers believed increased compliance costs negatively affect the industry. 2016
Private fund managers themselves distinguish costs from returns: a majority of surveyed managers opined that Dodd-Frank Act registration and disclosure requirements do not affect the returns of the private fund industry, even though compliance costs affect the profitability of their management companies. 2016
Beyond the authors' own prior work, there is no other empirical evidence on the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private fund industry. 2016
About 73% of the sample of 3,424 hedge funds consists of funds with AUM larger than $150 million, and only 26% falls into the smaller subsample. 2016
Smaller funds outperform larger funds in eight of twelve months in 2012, but performance varies strongly across the subsamples with no clearly dominant group on average. 2016
Despite conflicting government reports, the weight of post-crisis evidence from leading financial economists supports the conclusion that hedge funds introduce at least some systemic risk into the financial system. 2016
Hedge fund assets under management grew from $118 billion at the end of 1997 to more than $2.7 trillion by the end of 2014, a compound annual growth rate of 19 percent. 2016
Hedge fund losses large enough to affect the overall economy did not appear until after the crisis and recession had already been triggered by the mortgage market collapse and sustained stock market losses, which places hedge funds downstream of the crisis rather than at its origin. 2016
Redemption driven selling during the financial crisis of 2007-2008 was industry wide in scale: the hedge fund industry liquidated about 30 percent of its stock holdings. 2016
Concern about hedge fund leverage is empirically overstated: since the collapse of LTCM in 1998 the industry's exposure to leverage has been relatively modest, especially compared with the mean leverage of investment banks and broker/dealers. 2016
The study's evidence base is a PitchBook dataset of 77,508 United States venture capital deals involving 37,298 companies from 2005 through 2015, covering all venture capital deals and all venture capital stages. 2016
Companies that received venture capital investments have outrun and continue to outrun regulation and regulatory efforts, and they drive innovation trends in the United States and abroad. 2016
Existing regulatory processes are suboptimally equipped to address the challenges of exponential disruptive innovation, and the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act and the SEC illustrate the resulting suboptimal regulatory response rates. 2016
The study rests on two datasets: SEC Form ADV Part II filings by private investment fund advisers from 2007 to 2014 (N=100392) and the publicly available litigation record on private fund investor due diligence from 1995 to 2015 (N=572). 2016
The intensity of due diligence mentioning relative to total Form ADV Part II brochure filings increased substantially, and the due diligence count exceeded the total number of ADV II filings for the first time in 2014. 2016
Form ADV Part II filings jumped from 3,024 in 2010 to 21,685 in 2011, and that jump was accompanied by a corresponding increase both in the number of filings mentioning investor due diligence and in the due diligence counts within those filings. 2016
Although overall Form ADV Part II filings fell between 2012 and 2013, due diligence counts fell only marginally, from 20,828 to 20,031, and filings mentioning due diligence fell from 7,862 to 7,198, less than proportionally to the drop in total filings. 2016
Litigation research on private fund due diligence requires in depth evaluation of case dockets rather than only published judicial decisions, because opinions are snapshots that do not tell the whole story of a case. 2016
Legal decisions involving private fund due diligence increased substantially after 2005 and especially after 2008, and the broad, narrow, and hand selected case categories all increased consistently with a slight lapse in 2014. 2016
Madoff related cases following the discovery of the Ponzi scheme in 2008 only partially explain the significant increase in the prevalence and importance of private fund investor due diligence after 2009. 2016
Contrary to the hedge fund industry's own predictions, the industry has absorbed Form PF quickly and the impact of the Dodd-Frank registration and disclosure rules has proven much less intense than the industry initially anticipated. 2016
The majority of hedge fund advisers spent less than $10,000 preparing their initial Form PF data reporting to the SEC, and subsequent annual filings cost about half of that initial amount. 2016
The most pressing problem with Form PF identified by the majority of SEC registered hedge fund advisers is not the volume of data but the ambiguity of the data reporting requirements themselves. 2016
The overall effects of enhanced hedge fund regulation are not as immense as industry representatives predicted, but there is evidence that the enhanced Dodd-Frank Act rules do increase compliance costs for the industry. 2016
Prior survey evidence indicates that the hedge fund industry adjusted well to the Dodd-Frank registration and disclosure requirements, and that the actual impact of those rules was much less significant than the private fund industry had feared. 2016
Survey research on private fund advisers is structurally constrained because these advisers traditionally oppose publicity and hold a strong preference for confidentiality and privacy, which makes a substantial effective sample size difficult to obtain. 2016
Neither the 2012 nor the 2015 sample is biased, and the comparison across the two populations is consistent because respondents in both surveys were equally subject to Title IV compliance obligations. 2016
The decline in survey response rate between 2012 and 2015 is itself evidence of the private fund industry's relatively rapid adaptation to the new statutory and regulatory regime. 2016
A majority of private fund adviser respondents in both surveys, 72 percent in 2012 and 75 percent in 2015, did not plan any strategic response, meaning any action to avoid or limit the impact of Title IV. 2016
The share of advisers reporting that they changed their communications with investors nearly doubled from 25 percent in 2012 to 47 percent in 2015, a shift the author attributes to advisers increasing investor communications on advice of counsel. 2016
Although rare in absolute terms, structural responses grew: at least part of the industry is increasingly changing the legal structure of its funds and closing funds to new investors in response to the post-2012 regulatory changes. 2016
Between 2012 and 2015 the annual cost of Dodd-Frank compliance doubled for many survey respondents, moving from the $50,000 to $100,000 range into the $100,000 to $200,000 range. 2016
The shift of reported compliance hours out of the 251 to 500 hour band and into the 100 to 250 hour band suggests the industry became more effective at satisfying Dodd-Frank reporting obligations between 2012 and 2015. 2016
If compliance hour requirements are treated as a proxy for compliance cost, the survey data indicate that the cost of complying with all federal regulation, not just Dodd-Frank, increased between 2012 and 2015. 2016
Private fund advisers increasingly factor the regulatory structure into decisions about the size of their assets under management, a shift partly explained by the higher post-Dodd-Frank cost structure, since higher AUM and the corresponding fee revenue can offset higher compliance costs. 2016
The finding that advisers size AUM around regulatory cost is in tension with anecdotal evidence, since only a minority of private investment funds pay expenses out of the management fee at all. 2016
Sensitivity to the Form PF quarterly reporting threshold rose sharply: only 19 percent of 2012 respondents took the $1.5 billion threshold into account, compared with 33 percent in 2015. 2016
A majority of respondents in both surveys, 76.1 percent in 2012 and 65 percent in 2015, believed the Dodd-Frank Act did not affect their reporting funds' earnings. 2016
Among advisers who saw an earnings effect, the attributed cause shifted from direct expense to opportunity cost between 2012 and 2015, with opportunity cost references rising from 9 percent to 32 percent while increased expense references fell from 53 percent to 36 percent. 2016
By 2015 a clear majority of respondents, 93 percent, attributed effects on their investment management company's profits to additional expenses associated with the Dodd-Frank Act, and no respondent reported no additional expenses, compared with 19 percent in 2012. 2016
Five years after the Dodd-Frank Act, the private fund industry is most affected by the uncertainty and the higher costs the Act generates, yet on multiple metrics the industry is coping well with the evolving post Dodd-Frank regulatory landscape. 2016
The survey achieved a response rate of 5.44 percent from a population of 1267 registered private fund advisers. 2016
Because private fund advisers prefer confidentiality and generally oppose publicity, most do not respond to survey questions, which makes obtaining a substantial effective sample size for survey studies of this industry difficult. 2016
Guaranteeing complete anonymity is essential to obtaining a sufficient response rate from private fund advisers, but that guarantee prevents a broader descriptive statistical analysis of the sample. 2016
A 2013 survey found that Form PF compliance costs for first time filers were under $10,000 for 59.18 percent of respondents, while subsequent annual Form PF filings cost no more than $5,000 for 57.14 percent of respondents. 2016
A majority of private fund adviser respondents, 74.5 percent, do not plan any strategic response to Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. 2016
The most common adviser responses to Title IV are outsourcing compliance work, hiring additional counsel, instituting new record keeping policies, hiring additional staff, changing marketing materials, and changing communications with investors, all compliance updates rather than fundamental legal or strategic change. 2016
Private fund advisers in the sample did not terminate existing employment relationships, and only few severed advising relationships, changed fund legal structure, liquidated positions, changed investment styles or portfolio structure, or closed funds to new investors. 2016
Among respondents answering the open ended question on other actions taken, 30.8 percent hired a compliance firm, 15.4 percent said they otherwise wasted time and money reacting to Dodd-Frank requirements, and 15.4 percent implemented new policies and programs. 2016
Compliance cost is a significant issue for the private fund industry: a majority of respondents put Dodd-Frank compliance costs between $50,000 and $200,000, while a significant minority estimates total compliance cost between $200,000 and over $400,000. 2016
The largest group of respondents, 26.5 percent, estimated annual compliance cost for all federal regulations at between $100,000 and $200,000, while a smaller group of 14.3 percent estimated it at more than $400,000 a year. 2016
Reported compliance time tracks reported compliance cost: a clear majority of adviser respondents spent fewer than 500 hours complying with Title IV, while a noticeable minority of 11.5 percent estimated more than 1000 hours. 2016
For all federal regulations, 65.1 percent of respondents estimate total compliance time at between 100 and 500 hours, while a noticeable minority of 20.9 percent estimate it above 1000 hours. 2016
Of the advisers who responded, 70.60 percent would not take the current regulatory regime into account in determining the assets under management size of their funds. 2016
Among advisers who factor the regulatory regime into fund sizing, the direction of adjustment is split: 18.2 percent would lower assets under management to avoid the regulatory hassle, while 27.3 percent would still increase AUM and another 27.3 percent seek the right size to cover expenses. 2016
A majority of respondents already took the regulatory regime into account in sizing assets under management before the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, which implies that Dodd-Frank did not make much difference in how they run their business. 2016
The largest group of respondents prefers an assets under management size between $500 million and $1 billion, and no clear majority preference emerges around the $1.5 billion Form PF quarterly reporting threshold. 2016
Sixty five percent of adviser survey respondents believed that their fund earnings were not affected by the Dodd-Frank Act. 2016
Among the minority of respondents who believed Dodd-Frank affected fund earnings, the majority attributed that effect to additional compliance costs rather than to lower returns. 2016
Of those who responded, 75.4 percent indicated that the profits of their investment management company were affected by the new registration and disclosure requirements, consistent with the management company, rather than the fund, bearing most of those costs. 2016
Half of the respondents indicated that the Dodd-Frank registration and disclosure rules create higher costs that will affect their funds over the next five years, while 17.4 percent expected no effect and 6.5 percent expected lower returns. 2016
Asked how Title IV will affect the private fund industry over the next five years, the largest groups of respondents identified additional expenses, at 34.9 percent, and barriers to entry for private fund market entrants, at 32.6 percent. 2016
Unconstrained mutual funds share multiple investment strategy and risk attributes with fixed income hedge funds, a finding the authors ground in trading data and prospectuses of all such funds launched from 2010 through 2015. 2016
Unconstrained mutual funds have not delivered superior performance: Morningstar data for funds with three years of investing history offer no evidence that they outperform mutual funds in comparable asset classifications. 2016
The authors operationalize unconstrained status by binary coding eleven prospectus characteristics and treating a score of nine or better as unconstrained, producing a final study sample of 84 funds out of 114 funds identified in the Morningstar Nontraditional Bond index. 2016
Unconstrained mutual funds are proliferating at a significant rate, growing steadily since 2007, with the overall trend between 2010 and 2015 showing a steady increase in launches. 2016
Unconstrained mutual funds exceed typical mutual fund trading engagements in almost all quantifiable categories, often by double or quadruple the average engagements for mutual funds as a group. 2016
Average unconstrained mutual fund portfolio turnover exceeds the turnover of other fixed income mutual funds by over 150 percent. 2016
Unconstrained mutual funds engaged in almost 50 percent more futures contract transactions than other mutual funds, and the overall scope and nature of their derivative use is consistent with what the authors would expect of a private fund. 2016
Existing evidence about risk-shifting by the average derivative-using mutual fund is less relevant to unconstrained mutual funds, because their derivative use is closer to that of a typical private fund. 2016
The empirical base for the argument is a PitchBook dataset covering 77,508 completed United States venture capital deals involving 37,298 companies across all venture capital stages from 2005 to 2015. 2016
Using a hand coded dataset of 98 private investment fund advisers that use blockchain technology in their strategy or internal operations, the article shows that advisers using the new technology are able to charge overall lower fees. 2017
Survey responses from blockchain using private investment fund advisers show that their fee structure deviates from the traditional 2/20 model, with responding managers reporting alternative fee structures that benefited their clients. 2017
Fears that technologically untrained judges will misunderstand blockchain are overstated, because blockchain is no different from other software that courts have already evaluated, and courts assisted by well trained attorneys should be able to appreciate its significance. 2017
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the majority of private fund advisers who use blockchain, artificial intelligence, and big data in their operations or strategy charge substantially lower fees than advisers who do not use these technologies. 2017
The study rests on a hand coded dataset of 120 private investment funds that use blockchain technology in either their strategy or their operations, compiled by the author and research assistants from web searches and multiple databases. 2017
Private fund adoption of blockchain began in 2012, coinciding with the broader public debate over blockchain solutions, and took the form of managers setting up separate new fund entities that used the technology. 2017
In the study's dataset the clear majority of private investment funds using blockchain technology are engaged in venture capital rather than hedge fund or private equity strategies. 2017
The predominant uses of blockchain technology in the private investment fund industry originate in holding crypto assets of various kinds, which indicates that the technology plays its primary role in front office and investment functions rather than in back office administration. 2017
The third most important use of blockchain by private investment funds is support for fund growth, which is consistent with anecdotal evidence that returns attainable through crypto investments have no match in traditional finance. 2017
The dataset is incomplete by construction: the 120 fund advisers sampled did not answer all questions and the authors were often unable to obtain information on all questions. 2017
In the Fortune 1000 sample, minorities hold about 15 percent of employee positions but only 6 percent of management positions and 3 percent of executive level management positions, so representation falls as seniority rises. 2017