entity · derived
Corruption
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying corruption. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 3266953-011 : Nobody has yet created a reputation engine that is genuinely resistant to Sybil attack and that cannot be corrupted regardless of the economics at stake, despite the many platforms that capture reputa
- 3396522-017 : Conducting commerce on public blockchains counteracts corruption because every transaction becomes publicly visible and traceable to both consumers and the government, removing the untraceability that
- 3396522-018 : Stability drives a causal chain in commerce: the more stable a cryptocurrency, the more it proliferates, and the more stable cryptocurrencies proliferate in commerce, the less able corruption is to de
- 3402701-036 : The Folk Theorems of game theory prove that no protocol, however complex or well engineered, can eliminate corruption, understood as behavior that profits a minority at the greater expense of the majo
- 3402701-037 : No static set of rules can prevent the corruption that will eventually cause any stability design to fail, but a changing rule set administered by nimble governance can prevent that failure if enough
- 3406323-017 : The poor and those with less access to institutions bear a disproportionate share of the costs of using cash.
- 3406323-038 : Without a core common ethical denominator, decentralized systems cannot last: they lose coherence, become attackable, and can be corrupted, leading to suboptimal societal outcomes.
- 3441904-016 : Fungible cryptocurrencies are by their nature a corruptive element because decision makers can be influenced by power that grows with the size of fungible holdings; decentralized decision making there
- 3441904-017 : If curators and contractors are paid from a fungible currency source without a direct or indirect penalty for underperformance, such as lower token scores, DAO contractors and workers may be corrupted
- 3441904-019 : Corruption is possible whenever actors in a governance design can be identified, and every historical instantiation of institutional governance design involving identifiable humans was afflicted by co
- 3441904-023 : In delegated proof of stake protocols the significant block validation power of elected nodes leads to corruption, because those nodes are incentivized to bribe voters to be elected as delegates in ex
- 3441904-041 : Reputation based staking removes the corruptive elements of fungible tokens from voting because third parties are less likely to be able to take over a non fungible asset that is organically grown and
- 3652481-020 : DAO designs at the beginning of the 2020s did not effectively master the duality of incentives that a workable DAO governance design requires.
- 3652481-021 : The identity of actors in a DAO governance design typically creates corruptive elements, and merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.
- 3652481-031 : Reputation based staking removes the corruptive elements of fungible tokens because a third party is less likely to be able to take over a non fungible asset such as reputation that was organically gr
- 3709041-019 : Vote delegation inevitably reintroduces corruption into a microdemocratic system, because representatives may seek to bribe or purchase votes to gain power, so delegation necessitates a policing syste
- 3782192-011 : Corruption is defined as a minority subgroup collecting the power or wealth of an organization for its own benefit at the expense of the larger group.
- 3782192-012 : The more rigid an organization's structure, the more susceptible it is to corruption; at the chaos stage there is no protocol rigidity and therefore no opportunity for corruption, because with no grou
- 3782192-013 : Corruption is technically inevitable in any hierarchy, because it is impossible to create a perfectly efficient organization in practice and there is friction in every real system.
- 3782192-015 : As members constantly probe the edge of acceptable behavior, policing the rules becomes more expensive, the rules become divorced from the shared goals, and relationships become brittle and formal ins
- 3782192-016 : No static set of logical rules can ever succeed in preventing corruption, which is the ultimate problem with relying on letter of the law governance instead of spirit of the law governance.
- 3782192-017 : The Folk Theorems of game theory prove that any rules that can be formally set down can be subverted: strategies always exist that follow the rules and still allow a minority player to profit at the e
- 3782192-021 : Rigidity generates corruption: because a rigid organization ignores new information incompatible with its structure, the unexploited value creates an opportunity for an individual to capture it for pe
- 3782193-002 : Rigid hierarchies are unstable and inevitably fall, eroded either by internal corruption or by novel external challenges that the hierarchy is not flexible enough to adapt to. These are the second and
- 3782193-003 : In a rigid competitive hierarchy governed by secular laws, internal corruption arises because each member's optimal strategy is to push the written rules to their limit, while externally any change in
- 3782201-017 : Human middlemen have an incentive not to entirely eliminate the corruption they are paid to overcome, which is one reason they become falsely identified with the friction itself.
- 3782201-019 : The correct goal is not to eliminate the middlemen but to automate them, because unlike human middlemen automated middlemen can be designed so that they do not contribute to the corruption they were b
- 3782205-007 : Core institutions are perceived as leaching from the economy only because of corruption, and well designed systems eliminate those economic frictions.
- 3782205-016 : If an organization's goal is to maintain decentralization, its tools must be used deliberately to prevent the natural concentration of power that occurs when economic inefficiencies create pockets of
- 3782205-019 : The executive policing functions of business and government should be automated through smart contracts in order to prevent corruption.
- 3782214-002 : Corruption has arisen in every organizational circumstance in recorded history, including the least extreme case of identified members of a single culture interacting face to face with deep community
- 3782214-012 : The authors stipulate corruption in an organization as any action that benefits a minority at the greater expense of the group, and locate its source in power that is distributed inappropriately as me
- 3782214-013 : Recording every action on a blockchain does not by itself defeat corruption, because more information does not ensure more productive collaboration; members must additionally be motivated to behave co
- 3782214-020 : The very explicit rules that unify a diverse group destabilize it over the longer term, because internal corruption and external change render a fixed rule structure ineffective or inefficient.
- 3782214-037 : Without the ability to hold representatives to account, representatives are not incentivized to vote for outcomes reflecting their constituency's wishes and needs, but instead promote agendas that ser
- 3782220-014 : Overhead institutions such as insurance and policing act as catalysts supplying the activation energy that guarantees liquidity in both government and private business.
- 3782220-031 : As an organization loses touch with its transcendental values, members use the rules to jockey for position in the hierarchy and corruption erodes the organization's effectiveness.
- 3782220-032 : The same ability to learn from others' behavior that unleashes the efficiency of cooperation also gives people untold power to trick others, imagining how to manipulate them and corrupt the organizati
- 3799320-014 : When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of a DAO with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal and external participants will typically attempt to corr
- 3799320-015 : The identity of actors in a DAO governance design is itself a source of corruption, so merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.
- 3808873-011 : Centralization follows an S curve: in the expansion phase the benefits of centralizing power, capital and control rise faster than its costs, but in the decline phase the rising costs of centralizatio
- 3808873-038 : When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal and external participants will typically attempt to corru
- 3949098-035 : If the DAOIC is perceived as having a market impact, it could significantly increase corruptive influences from other market players, which in turn increases the likelihood of regulatory intervention,
- 3981021-029 : Reputation staking avoids the corruptive effects of fungible token staking because non fungible reputation has to be built organically through merit and time, needs to be earned, and cannot be bought.
- 5554218-021 : Coded automation leads inevitably to corruption of the system and must be supplemented with decentralized governance of the code, which produces preferable outcomes and improved ethics.