entity · derived
Information asymmetry
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying information-asymmetry. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1428387-022 : Moral hazard is worsened when the financial products traded are so complex that the agents, mostly on the buy side, do not entirely understand them and trade for the principal on the basis of incomple
- 1428387-037 : Regulation targeted only at retail investors is misdirected, because incomplete and asymmetric information, bounded rationality, and moral hazard make it difficult even for professional and semi profe
- 1558614-020 : Director independence does not produce effective risk monitoring: as the failure of independent director oversight at Lehman Brothers and other large U.S. financial firms shows, independent directors
- 1664809-023 : Legal uncertainty generates transaction costs, and European company boards will inevitably incur costs minimizing the information asymmetries created by different legal regimes that may or may not app
- 1908473-010 : Contingent capital offers only limited protection against information asymmetries, principal and agent conflicts, and collective action problems, so it cannot by itself prevent economic failure.
- 1908473-011 : Existing proposals for implementing contingent capital do not explain how they would address the information asymmetries and principal and agent problems that may lie at the core of the credit crisis.
- 1908473-029 : Information asymmetries between market participants and a systemically important institution's management before default can be reduced if a financial weakening after conversion of contingent capital
- 2267560-018 : Private rulemakers have a comparative advantage over public rulemakers in the dynamic regulation framework because public rulemakers lack comparable access to timely and institution-specific informati
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-010 : Directors who are inadequately informed about the expected standard of conduct will underestimate their personal liability exposure and engage in riskier behavior than is desirable for the company its
- 2831040-003 : Regulators face a two ended timing trap: at the early stage of an innovation they lack information about its possible impact, and at the later stage the innovation is entrenched, so regulatory change
- 2831040-023 : Early regulatory intervention is subject to massive information asymmetries and associated regulatory uncertainty because the early stage of an innovation often provides insufficient information about
- 3067615-025 : ICOs provide the highest possible liquidity for investors at the very beginning of a platform's lifecycle, before the reporting, accounting, and legal infrastructure that gives the investing public as
- 3227967-004 : The traditional knowledge transmission model of education is ill suited to a world of fast paced change and easy access to information, because prior experience may not be relevant to a fast changing
- 3227967-006 : In early Silicon Valley the contractual mechanisms lawyers designed, together with the lawyer dominated market for reputation, reduced information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors and w
- 3373393-007 : Agency problems originate from the lack of trust between principals and agents, which itself stems from information asymmetries and agents' opportunistic self-interested behavior.
- 3373393-008 : Because of bounded rationality, incomplete foresight, and information asymmetries, it is impossible for principals to contract for every possible action or inaction of the agent so as to induce the ag
- 3396522-021 : Extreme illiquidity combined with the herd mentality of crypto investors systematically benefits speculators, because it lets apparent scarcity materialize out of nowhere precisely when investors are
- 3396522-023 : Central bank price stability is elusive for two structural reasons: central banks are constantly lobbied to move money supply away from equilibrium, and even absent lobbying they face information asym
- 3405401-017 : Smart contracts leave counterparty information asymmetries unresolved: the tenant of a smart property cannot fully know whether the landlord is providing a worthy property, and the landlord cannot kno
- 3405660-003 : Hedge fund secrecy is not incidental but competitively necessary: the less the market knows about a fund's activities, the easier it is for the fund to compete and generate the returns clients demand.
- 3405660-004 : Neither national nor international regulators have the resources to fully investigate or regulate hedge fund activity, and the industry actively lobbies to preserve the resulting information asymmetri
- 3405660-036 : The internal ratings based approach reduces information asymmetry because internal ratings capture supplementary borrower information that external credit assessors cannot reach and cover a broader ra
- 3405660-038 : Under an indirect approach hedge funds can remain exempt from disclosure and transparency requirements because only the financial intermediaries are required to reveal the relevant information, which
- 3782193-030 : The strong trust that sustained Maghribi trade, in which embezzlement was rare despite extreme information asymmetry, cannot be explained by a strong centralized government, since the Maghribis could
- 3782210-002 : Markets collapse when opportunistic behavior saps the efficiency of cooperation: once the environment becomes too adversarial and trust is diminished, collaboration is no longer profitable.
- 3808852-009 : Because of human shortcomings, bounded rationality, incomplete foresight, and information asymmetries, it is impossible for principals to contract for every possible action or inaction of the agent so
- 3808852-028 : Decentralized exchanges may fail to ensure market integrity, because the code that creates a DEX can allow asymmetric distribution of trading information based on user status.
- 3931933-015 : The initial Casper testnet group was hampered by communication shortcomings, with only around 680 validators present in the telegram group that served as the main channel for news and updates.
- 3962614-010 : Significant information asymmetries in venture capital can lead portfolio company managers to engage in opportunistic behavior after an investment is made.
- 3962614-015 : As a rule of thumb in early investment rounds, the lower the information asymmetry the lower the payout, and below a certain threshold of established value venture capitalists will rarely invest at al
- 3962614-018 : Information asymmetries increase in traditional VC investment rounds because startups are incentivized to self censor when engaging with VCs, having little data to work with and being reluctant to ove
- 3981021-034 : Anonymity increases the value of the reputation token, because as information asymmetries and incomplete information increase, the value of the information that derives from reputation tokens increase
- 4033886-010 : Arbitrage trading emerges in crypto markets because of information asymmetries across exchanges, which arise from imperfect disclosure, and the resulting decline in market efficiency is a key indicato
- 4900878-011 : In a quantum game model of a two firm market, monopoly emerges once informational asymmetry passes a threshold, and the result is lower total quantity and reduced economic efficiency.
- 4900880-016 : In a quantum game model of a market with informational asymmetry between two firms, monopoly emerges once the informational asymmetry passes a threshold, and total quantity and economic efficiency fal
- 5886442-018 : The premise of asymmetric information is architecturally invalidated in the AI-to-AI economy because every inference, parameter update, decision trace and model weight is by design cryptographically a
- 6421319-019 : Hidden action and hidden information are not merely reduced but rendered computationally impossible at the substrate level, because every inference, parameter update, decision trace, and model weight
- 6421319-021 : If probabilistic AI agents cannot reliably distinguish truth from fabrication, the lemons problem and signaling games retain relevance, but the asymmetry relocates: it now runs between agents that can
- 6607458-012 : In generative exchange a counterparty cannot evaluate the quality of a generative distribution from a single realization, so a verified track record of prior generative outputs is required; reputation
- 6607458-017 : Computational abundance does not eliminate information asymmetry; it transforms its locus, since traditional informational advantages such as knowledge of market conditions, contract terms, and domain
- 6655138-025 : An agent may fund a proposal it generated itself in order to derisk it for downstream funders, because posting a proposal with the architect's own seed bounty signals commitment and reduces the inform