entity · derived
Proof of stake
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying proof-of-stake. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2992962-007 : Proof of work mining carries significant externalities: the authors estimate that the total energy cost of running the global network of computers solving proof of work puzzles was around 700 million
- 3125822-013 : The tragedy of the commons arises in any system lacking a well designed incentive structure; in blockchain proof of stake design this is the nothing at stake problem, where unregulated systems lead ps
- 3125822-033 : In the proof of stake application, a block is accepted by the network only if it carries proof of success in a betting pool, and that stamp constitutes the entire cryptographic security of the chain a
- 3125822-034 : A proof of stake lottery on this architecture is vulnerable because the seed of the pseudorandom generator that names the next block author is partly controlled by the current block author, which lets
- 3125822-035 : The author contests Houy's claim that killing a proof of stake currency costs nothing: on this platform the token's value is calculably predictable rather than merely a function of public opinion, and
- 3125827-001 : No single, fixed, entirely algorithmic policing solution can completely prevent independent nodes in a distributed system from gaming block production to advantage some parties over others. Any consen
- 3125827-002 : A successful proof of stake protocol must be flexible enough to continually police new attack strategies, because changing market forces and network performance keep creating new opportunities to prof
- 3125827-003 : A secure proof of stake protocol requires an incentive structure that perpetually motivates users to do three things at once: produce valuable blocks, police blocks that violate protocol, and improve
- 3125827-005 : Because the stakes in SPoS are reputation tokens that are far less fungible than cryptocurrency stakes, long term probity is incentivized and many short term arbitrage opportunities are eliminated. Fu
- 3125827-009 : Even though proof of stake mitigates the economy of scale advantage, block production cartels can still arise in PoS systems through lotteries, through built in voting delegations, or because the stak
- 3125827-014 : Because almost all other blockchains distribute perfectly fungible currency tokens through initial sales or mining, there is a clear, computable answer to how much it would cost to corrupt or destroy
- 3125827-015 : The long range attack is a fundamental problem every proof of stake protocol must address: because no energetic outlay is required to build blocks, a malicious producer can fabricate a long chain fork
- 3125827-040 : A malicious party using Sybil accounts cannot be prevented from cloning the structure of a successful proof of stake blockchain at far lower cost than cloning a proof of work chain, leaving a new user
- 3227967-036 : The real design challenge for consensus protocols is to find a proof of stake protocol that offers both trust and security without unintentionally creating just another centralized validation system.
- 3249860-039 : Attempts to increase throughput and scale in consensus protocols concentrate on proof of stake, and the data are consistent with anecdotal evidence that proof of stake may be the most dominant attempt
- 3266953-020 : The fungibility of the staked currency is the main point of attack against proof of stake and leads inevitably to centralization.
- 3782198-032 : Proof of stake carries an unresolved failure mode: if anyone devises a clever algorithm for hijacking the block producer selection process, the network would fail.
- 3782198-033 : Blockchain transactions will always be expensive whether or not proof of stake is solved, because full participation requires downloading the entire transaction history to verify validity, an extreme
- 3782203-026 : Marketing a consensus algorithm as correct by construction is false advertising, because such proofs establish resistance only to the attacks the theorists considered reasonable at the time, not to al
- 3782203-028 : Since no algorithm can be perfectly secure in all circumstances, protocol developers should redirect effort from proving algorithms correct to building a governance process that updates the algorithm
- 3782210-036 : A meaningful reputational system with the potential for retrospective review would let a network rely on fewer nodes, since randomly selected nodes staking their reputation can do the polling work and
- 3931933-001 : In conventional Proof of Stake, selection probability for block rewards rises with stake and block rewards are constant regardless of node reputation, whereas in Secure Proof of Stake nodes with highe
- 4796714-014 : Proof of Stake consensus centralizes control in proportion to the quantity of tokens held, so governance built on such chains is skewed in favor of the wealthy rather than distributed.
- 5225296-013 : Long-range attacks, in which adversaries rewrite history using old keys, are mitigated in SPoS by requiring verifiable participation of current stakeholders.