entity · derived
Incentive design
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying incentive-design. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2097160-003 : Contingent convertible bonds placed in executive compensation serve a different purpose than those sold to investors: the point is not capital infusion during a crisis but governance-improving design
- 2273857-065 : The threat of heightened scrutiny under a deferred prosecution or corporate integrity agreement optimizes incentives because increased government monitoring attaches only after a first time offense, g
- 2992962-035 : The economic incentive for Aragon judges to follow the more popular vote, since judges keep their bond only if they voted with the majority, calls into question whether the mechanism delivers effectiv
- 2998033-022 : Requiring data scientists to stake a cryptocurrency on their own predictions converts private confidence into a public signal, which enables the fund to select the optimal model and improve fund perfo
- 3125822-004 : The novel element of the architecture is a dynamical evolutionary feedback system that ties an expert's reputation to their proof of ability and productive contributions, verified by validation pools
- 3125822-010 : The chosen expert is deliberately not paid directly out of the fee but only indirectly in newly minted tokens, because the architecture secures itself by making reputation more valuable than any one t
- 3125822-013 : The tragedy of the commons arises in any system lacking a well designed incentive structure; in blockchain proof of stake design this is the nothing at stake problem, where unregulated systems lead ps
- 3125827-003 : A secure proof of stake protocol requires an incentive structure that perpetually motivates users to do three things at once: produce valuable blocks, police blocks that violate protocol, and improve
- 3125827-004 : Because all block creation fees are shared with the whole group as a reputation weighted salary, SPoS removes the direct monetary reward for forming mining pools or block production cartels, which the
- 3125827-020 : The current dominance of altruists in the crypto space will not persist: once the crypto economy matures, an influx of hedgers and rent seekers can be anticipated with certainty, and they will exploit
- 3125827-021 : Successful proof of stake experiments running today cannot be used to infer that their protocols are truly secure, because the current participant population is atypically altruistic; confidence must
- 3128900-019 : The protocol architecture together with its incentive structure is what produces enhanced 51 percent attack resistance, which the author claims exceeds prior reputation verification attempts in both d
- 3128900-024 : Staking creates disincentives for malicious actors, and it is this disincentive structure that makes the network both more efficient and attack resistant.
- 3128900-025 : Verifiers stake proportionally smaller amounts of reputation tokens than workers, because their higher reputation scores make them less likely to be malicious actors.
- 3128900-026 : Reputation scores clear the market on both sides: a low requester score makes workers less likely to accept that requester's offers, and a low worker score reduces the worker's likelihood of retention
- 3128900-029 : Sharing all work fees with the expertise creates a positive feedback loop: the more fees flow to the platform, the more reputation is worth, and the more workers prefer reputation tokens to one time f
- 3227967-035 : A reputation verification platform matters because trust created through an eternal reputational record would be open to review and driven by proper incentives.
- 3249860-001 : Crypto-economic incentive design is only limitedly successful at shaping future human behavior, because the designer must speculate about future human mental states and belief systems that may turn ou
- 3266953-016 : Putting the counterparties' reputation at stake reverses smart contracting's degeneration, because the opportunity to earn new valuable reputation tokens makes members act in ways that improve the pla
- 3266953-023 : A successful Semada block producer wins half of the newly minted reputation tokens for a block while the remaining members share the other half for policing the block in the validation pool.
- 3266953-024 : Because all fungible fees are already shared in proper proportion among Anchor holders, participants have less reason to join a mining pool, which makes the system more decentralized.
- 3266953-034 : Semada's voting algorithm is designed so that gaming the system is not economically feasible without contributing genuinely valuable improvements, because value is proven through the fees added to the
- 3396522-038 : Merchant adoption of stable cryptocurrencies turns on a concrete threshold: merchants pay 2.9 percent to credit card companies on non cash transactions, so any medium of exchange costing less than 2.9
- 3396542-005 : Tokens in the proposed DAO function as reputation because an agent's proportional token holdings will grow over time only if that agent follows sound and successful underwriting practices.
- 3396542-007 : Insurance premia are treated as revenue of the entire DAO rather than of the underwriters who wrote the policy, and are shared among DAO participants; consequently the value of a token is a function o
- 3396542-008 : Because newly minted reward tokens go only to agents who stake tokens on policies, passive holders are diluted over time, which pushes agents toward active underwriting while still permitting passive
- 3396542-016 : Unlike prior token research, the purpose of issuing tokens here is not only to raise capital but also to give owners the opportunity and incentive to develop the DAO's business.
- 3396542-034 : Trust requirements in the DAO are minimized by appropriately designed economic incentives rather than by intermediary reputation or regulation.
- 3402701-010 : Distributing newly minted coins to shareholders, as Basis planned, is exploitable: shareholders can collude to hold their new money and drive the price up, which triggers further minting that benefits
- 3402701-040 : The authors recommend an SDAO governance design coordinated through reputation-weighted democratic governance, whose core objective is to create incentives that lead independent and selfish actors to
- 3405401-024 : Reputation used as a metric and store of value does not lead to centralization because it must be earned, it can be lost, and it cannot be converted into a fungible store of value exchangeable for goo
- 3406323-010 : In decentralized systems profit generation rests less on capitalistic economies of scale and more on open source volunteer contributions and greater good perspectives, with profits arising only if and
- 3406323-039 : A DAO's profit distribution weights across present workers, past workers, protocol designers, and governance designers should match the DAO's current values, since a greater share for new workers attr
- 3406323-041 : A dynamic, changing set of governance rules can address the problem that any static rule set is gameable, and can establish the incentives necessary to stop such abuses.
- 3409548-010 : Requiring data scientists to stake a cryptocurrency on their own predictions is a workable remedy for overfitting, because the stake expresses confidence in live performance and lets the fund select t
- 3411897-040 : For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes, there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group, which is why static dece
- 3441904-016 : Fungible cryptocurrencies are by their nature a corruptive element because decision makers can be influenced by power that grows with the size of fungible holdings; decentralized decision making there
- 3441904-017 : If curators and contractors are paid from a fungible currency source without a direct or indirect penalty for underperformance, such as lower token scores, DAO contractors and workers may be corrupted
- 3441904-043 : Reputation based DAO governance turns a zero sum game into a positive sum game, because members are given incentives to build lasting non fungible value through a long term record of productive cooper
- 3441904-046 : DAO incentives are intrinsic rather than extrinsic: the core common denominator for all DAO token members is the unifying desire to optimize the DAO structure and reputation token value, whereas hiera
- 3606663-018 : Anonymity in decentralized networks imposes a specific design constraint: system architects need a special skillset to navigate the limits that anonymity places on system design, and that skillset rem
- 3606663-022 : Token design must be treated as an iterative process in which data collection and flexibility in core design parameters are essential, because prior crypto economic assumptions routinely turn out to b
- 3652481-019 : Overcoming attempts by rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game a DAO's governance design requires a duality of incentives, in which actors improve their own utility while
- 3652481-020 : DAO designs at the beginning of the 2020s did not effectively master the duality of incentives that a workable DAO governance design requires.
- 3709041-002 : Blockchain technology incentivizes direct transactions between creator and consumer, including compensation, which eliminates the need for intermediation.
- 3709041-007 : Both dominant ideologies fail in symmetrical ways: capitalism produces inequity, inequality, monopolies, and other market failures, while socialism has incentive design defects in which hard work is n
- 3782193-025 : Giving the Apaches cattle in 1917 succeeded where military force had failed because the valuable assets created a zero-sum battle over resources between lineages, generating the internal competition n
- 3782193-026 : The authors accept Brafman and Beckstrom's thesis that the best way to convert a decentralized organization into a centralized one is to introduce the profit motive, since money supplies a focal point
- 3782193-029 : Good ideas will fail to be implemented unless the reward structure is balanced, because people rarely keep working idealistically toward group goals while rent seekers at the top split the rewards unf
- 3782193-032 : Adding reputation to the contracting game converts it from a single-stage zero-sum game into a repeated positive-sum game in which the rest of the community becomes relevant, because reputation is a f
- 3782198-003 : The social media coordination function remains largely flawed and corruptible because the incentive design underlying social proof is suboptimal.
- 3782198-004 : Rating systems on centralized marketplaces are actively gamed: new Amazon sellers are solicited by sock puppet operators offering to inflate their ratings and attack competitors.
- 3782198-005 : Social networks grow exponentially more powerful through the network effect, but they are stifled by the centralized ownership and governance of the Web 2.0 companies that run them; governing decentra
- 3782198-007 : If a peer to peer network were decentrally owned by its users, its algorithms could be open source and still remain safe, because the network could reward members for policing exploitation instead of
- 3782198-010 : The incentive design in which originators of TCP requests pay the bill failed to solve web hosting costs, because the Tragedy of the Commons asserted itself and porn and pirated file sharing, sometime
- 3782198-021 : Earlier centralized companies defeated more decentralized peer to peer platforms because of the technology of the time and the incentive design built into capitalist civilization: consumer devices cou
- 3782198-022 : Existing decentralized filesharing networks cannot guarantee the availability of unpopular files such as personal files, whereas centralized cloud services guarantee availability for a fee.
- 3782198-037 : Anonymity should be balanced rather than absolute: a member's power to broadcast should be tied to a pseudonymous account carrying meaningful and valuable reputation that is lost when the broadcasting
- 3782201-009 : Keeping a decentralized organization aligned in pursuit of its goals requires providing something more valuable than money, namely reputation, following the Maghribi traders' example.
- 3782203-024 : If the decentralized economy is constructed as a zero-sum game, cooperation becomes impossible because the only feasible long-term strategy is maximal extraction, and participants are incentivized to
- 3782203-039 : Because the Folk Theorems rule out a perfect reward system, the design goal for a DAO should be reduced to making it easier for members to help the group than to hurt it, with members themselves incen
- 3782205-008 : Keeping decentralized networks running productively requires a dynamic design with checks and balances combined with the incentive design insights of game theory.
- 3782210-006 : The failure of many DAOs to date is traceable to their reliance on the good will of network members rather than on engineered incentives.
- 3782210-021 : DAOs are free to organize as they choose, and those that fail to find the right incentives for productive behavior will certainly go extinct, because the feedback loop that includes customers outside
- 3782214-001 : Reputation changes the incentive structure of a decentralized organization from a single stage, zero sum game into a repeated positive sum game, which is why the authors treat reputation as the key to
- 3782214-013 : Recording every action on a blockchain does not by itself defeat corruption, because more information does not ensure more productive collaboration; members must additionally be motivated to behave co
- 3782214-014 : When currency is the entire proximal goal of a transaction, all participants naturally behave as selfishly as possible and exploit any opportunity for individual profit at the group's expense, which m
- 3782214-022 : The main problem with all current peer to peer governance structures is the lack of proper incentivization: participants are not motivated to improve the whole organization over the long term, so they
- 3782214-023 : A reputational system formally linked to profits makes members forward thinking and cooperative, counteracting the tendency of competition to separate them, and it also motivates members to self polic
- 3782214-035 : It does not matter what a DAO architect intends, because the resulting rules of the game are what tell players what to value; governance parameters therefore determine the organization's actual values
- 3782216-014 : Reputation must be grounded to be meaningful, so reputation tokens should be minted only when policy premia enter the group, reputation should dictate power, and fees should be shared through reputati
- 3782216-015 : Because underwriting mints new reputation tokens, passive holders see their proportional ownership in the DAO fall over time, which is designed to incentivize agents to underwrite actively while still
- 3782220-025 : Identifying a network's values is not an academic exercise: values determine goals, goals determine how rewards and punishments are set up, and that reward structure determines the network's future an
- 3782220-026 : Governance design choices must be matched to the network's values, because otherwise the reward structure will dictate the true goals and thereby determine what the network actually values.
- 3799320-013 : Effective institutional governance requires a duality of incentives, namely incentives for actors to improve their own utility while their actions simultaneously benefit the whole institution over the
- 3799320-014 : When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of a DAO with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal and external participants will typically attempt to corr
- 3808852-019 : At the beginning of the 2020s no forum existed that could support truly decentralized software development with a sufficient incentive design.
- 3808859-008 : The social media coordination function is still largely flawed because the incentive design underlying social proof is suboptimal; decentralized technology solutions can take over that coordination fu
- 3808859-021 : An optimally incentivized democratic decision-making tool would make separation movements in open source less likely, because voters who know the process rewards truth-seeking are more likely to accep
- 3808867-002 : Decentralized systems invert the collectivist tradeoff: rather than demanding that individuals sacrifice personal fulfilment for the group, they prioritize personal fulfilment because it produces the
- 3808867-004 : Capitalism and socialism each fail in characteristic ways: capitalism produces inequities, monopolies, and other market failures, while socialism suffers incentive design failures in which hard work i
- 3808867-013 : Elected representatives are incentivized to maintain their own power of office rather than to vote for outcomes reflecting the presumptive wishes and needs of their constituents.
- 3808867-019 : Unlike their centralized predecessors, decentralized technologies enable, for the first time in history, improved incentive designs that help overcome the insufficiencies in the voting outcomes of rep
- 3808873-001 : Improved incentive design is necessary but not sufficient for decentralization: better decentralized incentive designs can accelerate adoption, yet design alone will not produce the decentralization o
- 3808873-037 : Effective institutional governance, human or machine, requires a duality of incentives in which actors improve their own utility while their actions benefit the whole institution over the long run, an
- 3931933-012 : Validators who learned they would receive no reward shut down their nodes rather than waiting for the incentivization phase to end, so a reward scheme that visibly excludes participants loses their co
- 3931933-016 : Uptime based reward policies invite Sybil style abuse: on the original Casper testnet single persons ran fifteen or more validator nodes to exploit cloud provider promotions and the DEVxDAO rewards po
- 3931933-036 : HSPoS earns validator node reputation through a mechanism that is decoupled from the ordinary monetary system of incentive rewards.
- 3962614-036 : The incentives that undermine long term success of the hybrid model can be mitigated by mandating that staking on deals requires capital commitments, while allowing VCs to lower their capital commitme
- 3962614-037 : A better system emphasizes reputation by prohibiting capital investment into portfolio companies after an initial minting of reputation in proportion to incoming capital.
- 3981021-020 : In contrast to existing legacy structures that incentivize delay and hoarding, and depending on the respective DAO design, DAOs are incentivized to release the endowed assets immediately once the work
- 3981021-025 : Voting associate salaries are paid in fungible tokens pro rata to each associate's non fungible reputation score at the point of payment, which creates second order economic effects and indirect econo
- 4067783-019 : Reputation in a DAO should be generated only for long term valuable work and for the policing of work, and never for business development work.
- 4529715-034 : Short-term incentives in a decentralized insurance mutual would motivate decision-makers never to pay a claim in order to maximize current profit; incentivizing long-term alignment instead motivates t
- 4755632-040 : Paying workers a share of incoming compensation pro rata to their reputation scores makes rigor self-enforcing, because workers who do not engage with the required care lose their spot in the reputati
- 4796714-019 : Mandatory AI use reporting fails as a transparency mechanism because it assumes accurate and complete disclosure, while regulated entities have incentives to underreport or misreport in order to avoid
- 4796714-021 : Until the known attack vectors on decentralized autonomous organizations are solved, DAO based AI governance solutions remain suboptimal; these include Sybil attacks, tyranny of the majority, Arrow's
- 4900878-021 : Economic incentive designs are the core of tokenomics: they govern issuance, distribution, and use of tokens by emulating traditional monetary and fiscal policy and adapting it to the distinctive feat
- 4900878-022 : Supply side mechanisms such as token burns, which permanently remove tokens from circulation, and staking, which locks tokens up in exchange for rewards, let a token economy balance supply and demand